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On Improving the Legal Process of Claim
Interpretation: Administrative Alternatives
John F. Duffy*
Claims are the most important part of the modern patent
document. They are the “metes and bounds” of patent rights; they
“define[] the scope of the patentee’s rights.”1 Their proper
interpretation is frequently the central issue in infringement
litigation.2
It was not always so. Two hundred years ago, patent law and
practice knew of nothing resembling a modern claim, with all its
intricacies and formalities of drafting.3 The patent claim evolved
during the nineteenth century and assumed its place as the central
textual definition of the rights conferred by the patent. In those
hundred years, the claim’s remarkable evolution was so far
completed that a claim drafted at the very beginning of the twentieth
* Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. Copyright 2000 by
John F. Duffy. All rights reserved. The author thanks Kunio Fujishiro of the Japanese Patent
Office, Heinz Goddar, Ron Levin, Anne Sprightley Ryan and Toshiko Takenaka for their
assistance. Readers are welcome to send comments to the author at jfduffy@bigfoot.com.
1. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).
2. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 989 (Mayer, J.,
concurring) (“to decide what the claims mean is nearly always to decide the case”). The
observation is not unique to the United States. See, e.g., Molnlycke AB v. Procter & Gamble
Ltd., 26 IIC 92, 100 (Patents Court 1993) (“As is often the case the issue [of infringement] is
largely determined by deciding the proper construction of the patent.”).
3. Robert Fulton’s patent on the steamboat is generally credited with the “first examples
of real patent claims in the modern sense.” William Redin Woodward, Definiteness and
Particularity in Patent Claims, 46 MICH. L. REV. 755, 758 (1948); see also id. (humorously
noting that “Fulton might more properly be credited with the invention of the ‘claim’ than of
the steamboat”); Karl B. Lutz, Evolution of the Claims of U. S. Patents, 20 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y
134, 136 (1938) (crediting Fulton’s patent with “the first real ‘claims,’ in the modern patent
meaning”). The Patent Act of 1836 codified the statutory requirement for claims. See Act of
July 4, 1836, ch. 157, § 5, 5 Stat. 117, 119; Woodward, supra, at 759-60 (noting codification);
Lutz, supra, 142-143 (same). Claim drafting practice continued its development through the
nineteenth century, see id. at 143-56, 377-99, 457-89 (detailing the development), and today
whole books are dedicated to the subject. See ROBERT C. FABER, LANDIS ON THE MECHANICS
OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING (4th ed. 1998); THOMAS J. GREER, JR., WRITING &
UNDERSTANDING U.S. PATENT CLAIMS (1979); THE ART OF DRAFTING PATENT CLAIMS
(Joseph Gray Jackson & G. Michael Morris eds., 1966).
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century could easily serve as an examination question for law
students at the end of the century.4 The success of the modern patent
claim is demonstrated by its universal adoption in the patent law of
all major industrialized countries.
In the technology of law, the nineteenth century’s creation of the
patent claim ranks as one of the most important innovations in the
field of patent law, which is itself a significant innovation of the past
five centuries. But the advent of the patent claim is by no means the
culmination of legal process development in the field of patent law.
This article examines one area in which recent development has been
especially swift, and in which new innovations are likely in the
future.
Only a half decade ago the law governing the allocation of power
to interpret patent claims could be characterized as radically
underdeveloped. Even on such a basic issue as whether the jury had
any role in interpreting claims, case law gave conflicting signals
without thoroughly discussing the matter.5 The law in the area was
like a primitive technology to which little thought yet had been
devoted. In the last five years, this has begun to change. Two major
cases— one decided by a unanimous Supreme Court, the other by a
deeply divided in banc Federal Circuit— have clarified a few basic
issues.6 Yet that case law has already created additional puzzles that
need solutions, while leaving obvious gaps in which the law remains
underdeveloped. Similarly, although many commentators have
examined the proper approach to claim interpretation,7 few have
4. A good example is a patent claim for the world famous 1903 invention by Orville and
Wilbur Wright of a system for achieving stable flight, which served well on the examination to
my introductory patent class (coincidently administered on the ninety-fifth anniversary of the
Wrights’ historic flight of December 17, 1903). The claim contained an ambiguity that led to
years of litigation with Glen Curtiss, whose improvement to the Wrights’ technology was
ultimately held to fall within their broadly drafted claim. See Wright Co. v. Herring-Curtiss Co.,
177 F. 257, 259-60 (C.C.W.D.N.Y. 1910) (finding Curtiss’s aileron structure infringed the
Wrights’ patent and granting preliminary injunction), rev’d on other grounds, 180 F. 110 (2d
Cir. 1910) (per curiam); Wright Co. v. Herring-Curtiss Co., 204 F. 597, 607-08 (W.D.N.Y.
1913) (finding infringement after full trial), aff’d 211 F. 652 (2d Cir. 1914) (per curiam).
5. See infra note 13 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 14-57 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., the collection of articles in the symposium, International Perspectives on the
Legal Interpretation of Patent Claims, 1 CASRIP (1994), the excellent comparative study by
TOSHIKO TAKENAKA, INTERPRETING PATENT CLAIMS: THE UNITED STATES, GERMANY AND
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studied in depth the allocation of interpretative power among the
legal actors in the patent system. They have focused on the how of
claim interpretation, not the who. Further development in the area
seems inevitable, and new innovation likely.
Examining the legal process of claim interpretation requires
attention to institutional development and innovation. Unfortunately,
as Professor Williamson notes, “the study of organizational
innovation has never been more than a poor second cousin to the
study of technological innovation.”8 Any scholar of the patent system
should reject that bias, for the history of patent law shows that the
technological progress so valued in our culture is inextricably
intertwined with the advancement of the legal and social norms by
which society organizes itself and provides incentives for productive
activity. To combat that bias, this article will adopt a method that
parallels methods of technological innovation. Patent law will be
examined as if it were itself an area of technology being studied by a
technician who wishes to understand and advance the area. Thus, in
addition to reassessing a particular doctrinal area, this article also
provides a study of, and an experiment in, method: It will employ the
innovator’s method to seek insight into a small but significant part of
the legal process of innovation.
Innovation and progress begin with a thorough understanding of
both the current technology and its shortcomings. Thus, part I of this
article introduces the existing law governing the institutional
allocation of the power to interpret patent claims. In the course of this
survey, part I highlights a specific procedural problem: By treating
claim construction as a pure issue of law subject to de novo review
JAPAN (1995), and the study by Judge Giles Sutherland Rich, Extent of Protection and
Interpretation of Claims— American Perspectives, 21 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT
L. 497, 499 (1990). The few articles to consider the interpretation of claims at the
administrative level include Craig Allen Nard, Legitimacy and the Useful Arts, 10 HARV. J. L.
& TECH. 515 (1997) (arguing for greater deference to the PTO’s patent claim constructions),
and Jochen Pagenberg, The Scope of Art. 69 European Patent Convention: Should Sub-
Combinations Be Protected?— A Comparative Analysis on the Basis of French and German
Law, 24 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 314 (1993), reprinted in 1 CASRIP 163,
185-87 (1994) (discussing the EPO’s approach to claim interpretation). Klaus Boehm also
considered the allocation of power in a patent system generally. KLAUS BOEHM, THE BRITISH
PATENT SYSTEM: I. ADMINISTRATION 148-62 (1967) (critiquing the “decision-taking” process
of the British patent system). That study, however, is now dated. 
8. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTUTITIONS OF CAPITALISM 404 (1985).
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on appeal, the case law has centralized claim interpretation in the
Federal Circuit. While such centralization can produce a desirable
uniformity in claim interpretation, it can also lead to dramatic
procedural inefficiencies. For example, a significant number of
infringement trials may be wasted if, as is likely, institutional
differences create frequent divergence between trial and appellate
interpretations.9 The challenge of reform is to eliminate procedural
inefficiency without sacrificing uniformity.
Concentrating on one specific problem is consistent with this
article’s overall goal of tracking the methods of innovation.
“Necessity is the mother of invention” is such a familiar adage
precisely because specific needs, problems, and questions help to
focus thought and clarify reasoning. Furthermore, targeting a discrete
problem is consistent with the large body of literature suggesting that
innovation often proceeds incrementally, with dramatic change
resulting only from the cumulation of many small improvements.10
Part II might be considered this article’s “Winslow Tableau,” for
it is patterned after In re Winslow’s image of the inventor “working in
his shop with the prior art references . . . hanging on the walls around
him.”11 Winslow’s image is compelling precisely because it contains
some truth. After identifying a problem, inventors often seek
inspiration from solutions tried in other contexts and other technical
fields. Part II thus provides a compendium of “the relevant prior
art”— the existing legal mechanisms that could be useful in analyzing
the technical problem introduced in part I. The tableau goes beyond
9. See, e.g., Elf Atochem N. Am, Inc. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 894 F. Supp. 844, 857
(D. Del. 1995) (lamenting that “in spite of a trial judge’s ruling on the meaning of disputed
words in a claim, should a three-judge panel of the Federal Circuit disagree, the entire case
could be remanded for retrial”).
10. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economic of Patent
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 881-82 (1990); SAMUEL HOLLANDER, THE SOURCES OF
INCREASED EFFICIENCY: A CASE-STUDY OF DU PONT RAYON MANUFACTURING PLANTS
(1965). See also John L. Enos, A Measure of the Rate of Technological Progress in the
Petroleum Refining Industry, 6 J. INDUS. ECON. 180, 180, 190 (1958) (finding that “improving
a process contributes even more to technological progress than does its initial development,”
but also that “there are diminishing returns to process improvement”).
11. In re Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017, 1020 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (Rich, J.). The late Judge Rich’s
image of walls covered with prior art reference has gained a modicum of fame and is often
referred to as the “Winslow Tableau.” See DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT
LAW 615 (1998); ROBERT PATRICK MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 557 (2d ed. 1997).
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American patent law to identify possible solutions from other
branches of domestic law as well as the law of other jurisdictions. For
expositional purposes, the proposed solution— a system of
administrative claim interpretation— is introduced early, but
otherwise part II remains consistent with this article’s general goal of
following the method of innovation.
Part III addresses the last and most difficult issue, albeit the one
simplest to grasp. The success of a technical invention is typically
evaluated by quantitative results. In the domain of technology,
practicality counts— not abstract analogies, nor a priori conjectures,
nor unsubstantiated predictions. For most technologies, quantitative
results are easy; the market provides them. The proof of the better
mousetrap is not that the world will beat a path to your door, but that
it will pay money once it gets there.
For innovations in legal process, however, market mechanisms for
testing innovations often do not exist. Or, perhaps it is better to say,
developing market-like mechanisms to test a legal technology can
itself be an accomplishment of great ingenuity. One such market for
legal technology involves the competition among American States for
corporate charters, a competition perennially won by Delaware.
While similar jurisdictional competitions are not likely for patent law,
more modest mechanisms are not unrealistic and could provide useful
testing for some legal process innovations. Part III discusses one such
mechanism and its application to the procedural innovation
introduced in part II.
Finally, it should be noted that the method adopted by this article
has its costs. By focusing on a specific technical problem in the legal
process of patenting, the article necessarily delves into the details of
patent administration. So too in considering the legal mechanisms
from outside American patent law, doctrinal detail is unavoidable.
Technological innovation requires gathering rays of insight from all
possible sources and then bringing them to bear— concentrating them
as with a lens— on the specific problem. Such a focus requires an
intensity and attention to detail that may delight only those curious
about the complexities of an intricate system. For those who prefer
generalities, Justice Cardozo’s advice is apt: “The timorous may stay
Washington University Open Scholarship
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at home.”12 For those undeterred, let us immerse ourselves in detail.
I. INTRODUCING THE PROBLEM: THE CURRENT LEGAL PROCESS OF
CLAIM INTERPRETATION
In 1995 the Federal Circuit observed that its own case law
contained “inconsistent statements as to whether and to what extent
claim construction is a legal or factual issue, or a mixed issue.”13
Since the distinction between law and fact has traditionally been one
of the principal devices for allocating decisional power among
various actors in the legal process, the acknowledgment of
inconsistency signaled an important gap in the law governing the
patent system. The courts have begun to fill this gap in the last five
years, but not without difficulty. Subpart A below traces the efforts of
courts in allocating the power to interpret claims and introduces the
problem noted earlier— by centralizing judicial claim interpretation in
the Federal Circuit, a large number of infringement trials could be
wasted due to interpretive divergences between the generalist trial
courts and the specialized appellate court. Subpart B examines an
issue the case law has not yet considered thoroughly— the allocation
of interpretive power between the courts and an administrative
agency. As this article will show, the two matters are related.
A. Interpretative Power Within the Courts: Markman and Cybor
In Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., the Supreme Court
unanimously held that the Seventh Amendment does not secure a
right to have a jury interpret patent claims, even in cases where
expert testimony has been introduced to clarify the meaning of a
disputed term of art in the claims.14 The scope and importance of the
Court’s decision is well demonstrated by the facts of the Markman
case itself.
The patent in Markman was on an “inventory control and
12. Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusements Co., 166 N.E. 173, 174 (N.Y. 1929) (Cardozo,
J.).
13. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc).
14. 517 U.S. 370 (1996), aff’g, 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc).
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reporting system” for dry-cleaning businesses.15 Two problems faced
by dry cleaners are (1) that customers’ clothing is occasionally lost at
an unknown point in the dry-cleaning process, and (2) that some
unscrupulous employees send unreported clothing through the
process and then pocket the cost of dry cleaning. The system invented
by Herbert Markman addressed these problems by, in the language of
the claims, “maintain[ing] an inventory total” in a computer system
that could be used to “detect and localize spurious additions to
inventory as well as spurious deletions therefrom.”16 Interpreting the
word “inventory” in Markman’s patent claims became the central
issue in the Markman-Westview litigation.
The allegedly infringing system manufactured by Westview was
similar to Markman’s patented system. Both systems included a
keyboard for entering data about a customer’s clothing, a printer for
generating bar-codes to be attached to the clothing, an optical scanner
for reading the bar-codes as the clothing passed through the dry-
cleaning process, and a computer for keeping track of the data.17
Westview’s computer system did not, however, retain information
about the articles of clothing; it remembered only the dollar amount
of invoices. Markman’s patent, as interpreted by Westview, covered
only systems maintaining an “inventory” that included descriptions of
customers’ articles of clothing. Westview contended that because its
system tracked only an inventory of money, it would not infringe
Markman’s patent under that interpretation of “inventory.”18 In
contrast, Markman argued that the word “inventory” in the patent
could refer to descriptions of clothing or tallies of cash.19
Long before the Markman litigation, it was settled law that patent
claims are interpreted as they would be understood by those skilled in
the art and, therefore, “[e]xpert testimony, including evidence of how
those skilled in the art would interpret the claims,” may be used for
15. 52 F.3d at 972 (quoting claim one of Markman’s patent).
16. Id. (emphasis added).
17. Id. at 972-73.
18. Id. at 973 (“It is undisputed that Westview’s system . . . does not retain information
regarding the particular articles of clothing, but rather only a listing of the invoices and the cash
total of the inventory.”).
19. 52 F.3d at 974.
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claim interpretation.20 Markman offered in support of his claim
interpretation his own testimony and testimony of an “patent
expert.”21 In contrast, Westview offered no testimony at trial to
support its interpretation of the claims and instead relied on the patent
specification and prosecution history.22 Though the jury found
infringement, the district court held claim construction to be “a
matter of law for the court,” adopted Westview’s interpretation, and
granted judgment as a matter of law to Westview.23
The cornerstone of Markman’s case on appeal was the expert
testimony presented at trial. Markman argued that the meaning of the
word “inventory” to a person skilled in the art was a question of fact
and that the expert testimony required the jury to make
determinations of fact and credibility. Therefore, Markman argued,
since the jury found against Westview, the Seventh Amendment
required federal courts to grant a significant amount of deference to
the jury’s finding.
Markman’s argument implicated the allocation of power not only
between the actors within the district court (the trial judge and jury),
but also between the district court and the Federal Circuit. If
Markman’s argument had been accepted, the courts would have had
to assume that the jury agreed with Markman’s expert testimony, and
the Seventh Amendment makes such jury findings very difficult to
overturn on appeal.24 Markman’s situation was not unique— many
20. Fonar Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 821 F.2d 627, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). See also
McGill Inc. v. John Zink Co., 736 F.2d 666, 675 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that “testimony of
expert witnesses may be used to construe claims” because “[s]uch testimony is evidence of
construction of the claims as they would be construed by those skilled in the art”). A trial
court’s refusal to admit expert testimony on claim construction can be reversible error. See, e.g.,
Moellar v. Ionetics, Inc., 794 F.2d 653, 657 (1987) (holding that trial court abused its discretion
in refusing to admit expert testimony on the meaning of the patent claims in dispute). 
21. 52 F.3d at 973. Markman’s expert was actually just a retained patent attorney, but as
the Federal Circuit noted, Markman himself was competent to testify as a person of “ordinary
skill”— perhaps, because he was an inventor, even “extraordinary” skill— in the relevant art. Id.
at 983.
22. Id. at 974.
23. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 1535, 1536 (E.D. Pa. 1991);
see also 52 F.3d at 973 (noting the jury verdict for Markman was in the form of answers to
general interrogatories).
24. The Seventh Amendment provides: “In Suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury shall, be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol2/iss1/5
211.doc 08/24/00
2000] The Legal Process of Claim Interpretation 117
patent trials turn on disputes over the proper interpretation of terms of
art in a claim— and therein lies the importance of the argument, for
there is no guarantee that judges and juries would reach identical
resolutions of those disputes.
Markman’s argument suffered rejection by every court to consider
it, including, unanimously, the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court,
however, did not gloss over the difficulty in characterizing claim
interpretation as an issue of law or fact. Acknowledging that
construing a term of art in a claim following the receipt of evidence
was “a mongrel practice,”25 the Court first tried to apply its
“historical test” for resolving Seventh Amendment questions, which
requires the Court to consider whether “the particular trial decision
must fall to the jury in order to preserve the substance of the
common-law right as it existed in 1791.”26 Of course, that test was
indeterminate because the patent claim itself was a legal process
innovation of the nineteenth century and the state of jury patent
practice at the end of the eighteenth century was “primitive.”27
Failing to find an answer in the pre-1791 common law, the Court
considered its own precedent but again found “no clear answers.”28
Ultimately, the Court turned to “functional considerations” to
resolve the issue.29 After again acknowledging that the issue in the
case fell “somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple
historical fact,” the Court relied on two functional considerations—
expertise in textual interpretation and the need for uniformity— to
hold that “judges, not juries, are the better suited to find the acquired
meaning of patent terms.”30 In considering the relative expertise of
the actors, the Court found that a “judge, from his training and
discipline, is more likely to give a proper interpretation to such
to the rules of the common law.” U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
25. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 378 (1996).
26. Id.  at 376.
27. Id. at 380. See also id. at 378-79 (“Prior to 1790 nothing in the nature of a claim had
appeared in British patent practice or in that of the American states.”) (quoting Karl B. Lutz,
Evolution of the Claims of U.S. Patents, 20 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 134 (1938)).
For additional history on the evolution of patent claims, see supra note 3.
28. 517 U.S. at 388.
29. Id.
30. See id. (citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)).
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instruments than a jury.”31 True, the Court acknowledged, expert
testimony may be needed for interpreting terms of art, and
“credibility judgments have to be made about the experts who testify
in patent cases.”32 Though a jury is generally thought to be the
appropriate institution for judging the credibility of witnesses, the
Court believed that the jury’s advantage in this area did not outweigh
the judge’s relative competence in textual interpretation since, “[i]n
the main, . . . any credibility determinations will be subsumed within
the necessarily sophisticated analysis of the whole document.”33
Furthermore, there was an overriding need for national “uniformity”
in defining patent rights.34 Uniformity was, the Court noted, the very
reason that Congress created the Federal Circuit in 1982, and that
goal would be “ill served by submitting issues of document
construction to juries.”35
The Court’s ruling in Markman provides a clear answer to the
question of whether juries will have any role in claim interpretation—
they will not. But unlike juries, all other institutions in the patent
system (the agency, the trial courts and the appellate courts) must
necessarily interpret patent claims in the course of performing their
functions. The terms of the Court’s opinion— particularly its repeated
acknowledgment that claim interpretation involved a mixture of
factual and legal inquiries— added uncertainty concerning the
allocation of power among those actors in the patent system.
Two years after Markman, the Federal Circuit addressed the
allocation of power between trial and appellate judges, and the
interests in national uniformity carried the day. In Cybor Corp. v.
FAS Technologies, Inc., a divided in banc panel of the Federal Circuit
held that it would treat claim construction “as a purely legal
question” and would review the issue “de novo on appeal including
any allegedly fact-based questions relating to claim construction.”36
For clarity the Cybor court expressly “disavow[ed] any language in
31. 517 U.S. at 388-89 (quoting Parker v. Hulme, 18 F. Cas. 1138, 1140 (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1849) (No. 10,740)).
32. Id. at 389.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 390.
35. Id. at 391.
36. 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (in banc).
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previous opinions of [the] court that holds, purports to hold, states, or
suggests anything to the contrary.”37
Yet despite the emphatic tones of the court’s opinion, a number of
factors limit Cybor’s value as a precedent. The majority opinion was
accompanied by no less than five separate opinions, each of which
either qualified or rejected the majority’s holding on the standard of
review.38 Cybor was also a very awkward vehicle for deciding the
issue. The trial judge had not made any findings of fact in construing
the claims, so the question of appellate deference to such findings
was not presented.39 Moreover, not one judge on the court of appeals
disagreed with the trial court’s claim construction.40 The dispute over
the standard of review thus had a hypothetical quality that stands
quite in contrast to Markman, where the relevant issue was well
framed by the conflict between the jury verdict and the judicial
construction of the patent.
The most significant weakness of Cybor opinion, however, is that
the court did little to reconcile its holding with a larger universe of
legal materials. That omission is unfortunate because the general
problem confronting the Federal Circuit— the allocation of decisional
power between trial and appellate courts for mixed questions of fact
and law— arises in many contexts outside of the patent law.41 
37. Id.
38. For a catalog of the separate opinions, see infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
39. See 138 F.3d at 1473 n.1 (Rader, J., concurring) (noting that the issue decided by the
majority was not as well presented in Cybor as it had been in Fromson v. Anitec Printing
Plates, Inc., 132 F.3d 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1997), where the district judge relied upon extrinsic
evidence and made findings of fact in interpreting the claims).
40. The case involved a patent on a dual stage pumping system that filtered and dispensed
precise amounts of liquid onto semiconductor wafers during their fabrication. 138 F.2d at 1451.
The dispute between the parties on claim construction concerned whether the “second pumping
means” described in FAS’s patent claims covered a pump that, like Cybor’s system, had an
external reservoir for fluid. Id. at 1457. All the judges in the case agreed that the “second
pumping means” described in the patent did cover a pump with an external reservoir, as
contained in the infringing product. Thus, the three judges who disagreed with the majority’s
holding on de novo review nonetheless concurred in the judgment affirming the district court.
See 138 F.3d at 1463, 1473, 1478 (Mayer, Rader, & Newman, JJ., concurring).
41. One sentence in the Cybor majority’s opinion states that “[n]othing in the Supreme
Court’s [Markman] opinion supports the view . . . that claim construction may involve
subsidiary or underlying questions of fact.” 138 F.3d at 1455. As the majority acknowledged
later, however, the Markman Court had described claim construction as a “mongrel practice”
falling “somewhere between the a pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact.” Id.
(citing 517 U.S. at 378, 388). Additionally, in the same year in which Markman was decided,
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No statutory law governs this area, and the only rule of procedure
remotely relevant, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), merely
requires that, in actions tried without a jury, the trial judge’s findings
of fact shall not be set aside by an appellate court “unless clearly
erroneous.”42 Because statutory law and procedural rules provide no
answer, appellate courts have developed judge-made common law to
govern the standards of appellate review over mixed issues of fact
and law.43 Yet that judge-made law has not been a model of clarity.
As the Supreme Court has noted, whether appellate courts should
afford deference in reviewing mixed questions is a “much-mooted
issue” with “substantial authority in the Circuits on both sides of th[e]
question.”44 The fractured court in Cybor mirrors that divergence of
authority.
The approaches championed by the judges in Cybor for reviewing
a trial court’s claim construction parallel three separate themes in the
case law governing appellate review of mixed questions of law and
fact. The dominant theme is that trial court rulings on mixed
questions are subject to de novo appellate review, which is the
standard adopted by the Cybor majority.45 Another theme, not
one Justice expressly classified Markman as a case involving “mixed questions of law and
fact.” Gasperini v. Center For Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 443 (1996) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Acknowledging claim construction as a mixture of law and fact does not undermine
the majority’s holding in Cybor because the dominant theme in other legal contexts is that
conclusions of lower courts on such issues are subject to de novo appellate review. See id.
(describing independent appellate review of mixed questions as “proper”); see also infra notes
45-50 and accompanying text.
42. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a).
43. The courts may even choose to apply the clear error standard in Rule 52(a) as a matter
of common law, even though the rule is technically inapplicable. See, e.g., United States v.
Page, 302 F.2d 81, 85 (9th Cir. 1962) (applying Rule 52(a) “by analogy” because no statutory
provision nor rule of procedure governed the standard of review for a trial court’s factual
determinations made in a hearing to suppress evidence in a criminal case).
44. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289-90 n.19 (1982). See also Cooter & Gell
v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 401 (1990) (noting “the difficulty of distinguishing between
legal and factual issues” in determining correct standard of appellate review); Spencer v.
NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 564 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (noting the doctrinal difficulties concerning “so-
called ‘mixed questions of law and fact’ whose vulnerability to review by appellate courts is
extraordinarily confused”). Nor is it unusual for the judges of a circuit to be unable to agree on
the appropriate review standard for mixed question of law and fact. See, e.g., United States v.
McKinney, 919 F.2d 405, 418-19 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring) (noting then-existing
disagreement within the Seventh Circuit on the standard of appellate review for mixed
questions of fact and law).
45. See, e.g., Haley v. Retsinas, 138 F.3d 1245, 1249 (8th Cir. 1998) (“This is a mixed
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necessarily inconsistent with the first, is that subsidiary findings of
fact should be reviewed only for clear error.46 Two of the twelve
judges on the Cybor in banc panel stressed this second theme in
arguing that some deference was appropriate in reviewing a trial
court’s claim construction.47 A third and final theme in the case law
suggests the possibility of an intermediate level of deference, not
necessarily as much as a clearly erroneous standard would afford,
that would apply to part or all of a trial court ruling on a mixed
question.48 Three judges in Cybor, including two who concurred in
question of law and fact, which we review de novo.”); Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416,
427 (2d Cir. 1998); Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco Inc., 24 F.3d 1565, 1576 (9th Cir. 1994).
9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2589, at 608 (2d ed. 1995) (noting the “substantial authority” that mixed questions of fact and
law are “freely reviewable”).
46. See Gilbane Bldg. Co. v. Federal Reserve Board of Richmond, 80 F.3d 895, 905 (4th
Cir. 1996) (reviewing mixed questions of fact and law “under a hybrid standard, applying to the
factual portion of each inquiry the same standard applied to questions of pure fact and
examining de novo the legal conclusions derived from those facts.”); see also Louisiana-Pacific
Corp., 24 F.3d at 1576 (“To the extent, however, that specific factual findings made by the
district court are in question, we review for clear error.”) (citing Rule 52(a)). The Seventh
Circuit had taken the position that the clearly erroneous standard applies generally not only to
subsidiary findings of fact, but also to a mixed question of fact and law. See, e.g., United States
v. Baldwin, 60 F.3d 363, 365 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J.) (holding “that appellate review of
determinations of mixed questions of fact and law should be governed by the standard of clear
error”), vacated, 517 U.S. 1231 (1996). In Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996),
however, the Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit and held that de novo review applies
to mixed questions of fact and law involving the Fourth Amendment. Nonetheless, the Seventh
Circuit has continued to apply the clearly erroneous standard in cases not directly governed by
the holding in Ornelas. See In re Teranis, 128 F.3d 469, 471 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that the
clear error standard applies in mixed questions of law and fact in bankruptcy without addressing
the Supreme Court’s holding in Ornelas). The Seventh Circuit’s approach appears to be
distinctly in the minority.
47. 138 F.3d at 1464-65 (Mayer, C.J., concurring the judgment) (endorsing application of
the clearly erroneous test to trial court findings of fact); id. at 1481 (opinion of Newman, J.)
(arguing that a “trial court’s factual findings with respect to evidence relevant to claim
construction should be treated, on appeal, like any other finding of the trial court”).
48. See, e.g., Loehrer v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 98 F.3d 1056, 1061 (8th Cir. 1996)
(“Though we normally exercise plenary review over mixed questions, we will afford deference
to the district court’s decision if ‘application of the rule of law to the facts requires an inquiry
. . . that is founded on the application of the fact-finding tribunal’s experience with the
mainsprings of human conduct.’” (quoting United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1202
(9th Cir.) (en banc))); Reich v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 44 F.3d 1060, 1069-70 (1st
Cir. 1995) (applying to mixed questions of law and fact a “somewhat nuanced standard of
review” that depends on where the question falls along a “degree-of-deference continuum: the
more fact dominated the question, the more likely it is that the trier’s resolution of it will be
accepted unless shown to be clearly erroneous”) (internal quotations omitted).
Washington University Open Scholarship
211.doc 08/24/00
122 Re-Engineering Patent Law [Vol. 2:109
the majority opinion, endorsed this approach.49 All three themes can
be seen in the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Ornelas v. United
States, which held that, in reviewing trial court rulings on Fourth
Amendment issues, appellate courts should (1) apply an
“independent . . . de novo” review standard to a trial court’s “ultimate
determinations” on the mixed questions of law and fact; (2) review
the trial court’s “findings of historical fact only for clear error;” and
(3) “give due weight” to the trial court’s “inferences” from the
historical facts.50
The choice between the possible approaches to reviewing such
questions cannot be made on the basis of metaphysical distinctions
between fact and law. As Chief Judge Posner has noted, trying to
decide what “really” constitutes fact and law is an “absurd” approach
to the problem.51 Indeed, even if the courts found a transcendent
touchstone to discern law from fact, no statute or other constraint
aside from the courts’ own case law would preclude granting
deference to lower court decisions on issues of law.52 Thus, as in
Markman, courts are making the choice on the basis of functional
considerations, including the comparative abilities of the institutions
in performing the interpretive task, the need for uniformity, and
general considerations of procedural efficiency.53
49. 138 F.3d at 1462 (Plager, J., concurring) (arguing that, though the standard of review
may be formally denominated de novo review, “common sense dictates that the trial judge’s
view will carry weight” and “the comparative advantage in claim construction effort and
accuracy . . . will no doubt influence the weight given to the trial court’s view”); id. at 1463
(Bryson, J., concurring) (“Simply because a particular issue is denominated a question of law
does not mean that the reviewing court will attach no weight to the conclusion reached by the
tribunal it reviews.”); id. at 1478 (Rader, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing for “some
deference where appropriate”).
50. 517 U.S. 690, 697, 699 (1996).
51. United States v. McKinney, 919 F.2d 405, 419 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring)
(“The point is not that it is ‘really’ a question of fact; that would be absurd.”). The distinction
between law and fact “is purely a creature of convention,” Gary Lawson, Proving Law, 86 NW.
U.L. REV. 859, 863 (1992), and, as some commentators have noted, the legal methods of
establishing propositions of law are analytically similar to the methods of proving facts. See id.
at 862; Peter Tillers, The Value of Evidence in Law, 39 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 167 (1988) (arguing
that legal actors rely on evidentiary proof to establish propositions of law).
52. The Supreme Court has stated that the grant of general appellate jurisdiction found in
28 U.S.C. § 1291 “implies the requisite authority to review independently a lower court’s
determinations.” Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991). But the Court has
not held that § 1291 requires de novo review. 
53. Those considerations generally govern the allocation of decisional responsibility over
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The difficult problem in Cybor was that, unlike in Markman, the
relevant functional considerations do not all favor one result. As the
Cybor majority noted, a desire for national uniformity still supports
treating claim interpretation more like an issue of law, with de novo
appellate review.54 But the comparative abilities of trial and appellate
courts in interpreting claims are debatable. Unlike juries, both trial
and appellate judges have expertise in textual interpretation. More
subtle factors distinguish the two institutions. Because of its
specialized jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit may be more familiar
with the “highly technical” art of claim drafting.55 Trial courts may
have better access to, and may be better able to evaluate, expert
testimony concerning how those skilled in the art would interpret the
claims— a point stressed repeatedly by the concurring judges in
Cybor.56 Finally, general considerations of judicial administration
support resolving claim interpretation early in litigation because
lengthy patent trials often must be repeated when an appellate court
reverses a trial court’s claim interpretation.57
Unfortunately, the Cybor court did little to acknowledge the
dilemma posed by allocating decisional power between trial and
appellate courts. The majority’s holding in favor of de novo review
must be viewed as an implicit determination that the need for
uniformity outweighs the efficiency costs of more vigorous appellate
review. But that choice could change with time and with new
information.
Together Markman and Cybor have, at least for the present,
centralized judicial power to interpret claims in the Federal Circuit.
Of the two cases, Markman seems most likely to endure as a stable
mixed questions of law and fact. See, e.g., United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1202
(9th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (stating that these considerations are “the concerns of judicial
administration— efficiency, accuracy, and precedential weight”).
54. 138 F.3d at 1455 (noting that deference to a trial judge’s claim construction would
undermine “this court’s role in providing national uniformity”).
55. Markman, 517 U.S. at 389 (quoting William R. Woodward, Definiteness and
Particularity in Patent Claims, 46 MICH. L. REV. 755, 765 (1948)).
56. See 138 F.3d at 1465 (Mayer, C.J., concurring in the judgment); Id. at 1477 (Rader, J.,
concurring in the judgment); Id. at 1480 (Newman, J., concurring in the judgment).
57. See 138 F.3d at 1474-76 & nn.2-3 (Rader, J., concurring) (detailing the procedural
difficulties created by de novo review and the Federal Circuit’s high reversal rate of trial court
claim constructions); see also id. at 1479 (Newman, J., concurring) (also discussing the
procedural inefficiencies created by de novo review).
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feature of the law. The Supreme Court is unlikely to reconsider a
unanimous constitutional ruling; the decision is consistent with the
law in other areas; and, perhaps most importantly, the functional
considerations in favor of allocating decisional power to the jury are
weak.
Cybor, however, is different. An obvious but nonetheless
significant point is that, due to personnel changes, the judges who
would give at least some weight to trial court interpretations are no
longer in the minority on the Federal Circuit.58 Moreover, courts in
other contexts have not provided any consistent or rigid rule to
govern appellate review on mixed questions of law and fact, and with
good reason. Both deferential and de novo standards trade one set of
costs for another and, because the choice between the standards is
governed by judge-made common law, the courts have been free to
adopt different approaches in different contexts. Variations occur
among the circuits, and it would be little surprise if the Federal
Circuit’s approach varies over time.
However, any formal change may matter little: Some judges will
still favor de novo review on every aspect of claim interpretation;
some will not; and all will agree that certain matters concerning claim
interpretation are to be independently reviewed. Whatever the formal
rule, the Federal Circuit’s common law for reviewing lower court
claim interpretations will have as much predictability and utility as
the general common law governing review of mixed questions of fact
and law. The general tenor of that common law is best demonstrated
by a case such as Ornelas, where the Supreme Court tried to resolve a
test for reviewing a particular class of mixed questions, but the clarity
of the Court’s guidance is compromised by the indeterminate
standard— “due weight”— incorporated into the test. Hopes for a
more definite resolution are unlikely to be soon fulfilled precisely
because the choice between de novo and deferential review involves
a difficult trade-off between uniformity and procedural expedience.
The interesting question then is not whether the claim
interpretations of trial courts will remain formally subject to de novo
appellate review, but whether the courts will permit or pursue
58. Five of the ten currently active judges on the Federal Circuit wrote opinions in Cybor
calling for some weight or deference to the trial court.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol2/iss1/5
211.doc 08/24/00
2000] The Legal Process of Claim Interpretation 125
procedural experimentation that may avoid hard choices between
uniformity and procedural efficiency. The Federal Circuit seems to
have rejected one alternative— permitting interlocutory review of
claim interpretations certified by a trial court pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b).59 While interlocutory appeals would avoid the
waste of trials where the district court’s interpretation differs from the
Federal Circuit, they would be expensive and time-consuming,
because the appellate process usually extends several months from
the time of docketing to decision and typically requires formal
briefing and oral argument. Other possibilities, including
administrative alternatives, should be considered. In part II, this
article investigates one such alternative— using administrative claim
interpretations to assist trial courts in claim interpretation. An
evaluation of this alternative, however, first requires an
understanding of the allocation of power between the courts and the
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) in claim interpretation.
B. Administrative Claim Interpretations: The Uncertain Relationship
Between the Agency and the Courts
Prior to Markman and Cybor, the law governing the allocation of
interpretive power among actors within the judicial system could be
characterized as underdeveloped: Cases gave conflicting signals on
the appropriate allocation of power without devoting significant
attention to the matter.60 After Markman and Cybor, that is no longer
true. The courts have considered the relevant issues so thoroughly
59. Section 1292(b) permits a district court to certify for immediate appeal “a controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion,” but the statute
gives the court of appeals “discretion” to hear the appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1993). When
Cybor was decided, the Federal Circuit had declined to hear such appeals. See Cybor, 138 F.3d
at 1479 (opinion of Newman, J.). See also Schering Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 375,
377 (D. Del. 1999) (noting that “[t]he Federal Circuit disfavors direct appeals from Markman
decisions”). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e), the Supreme Court could, by rule, make
interlocutory claim interpretations appealable by right. Such an intrusion by the Court into the
mechanics of patent litigation, however, seems highly unlikely given the Court’s recent
statement that it would respect the Federal Circuit’s “sound judgment in this area of its special
expertise.” Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997). See
also id. at 39 n.8 (“leav[ing] it to the Federal Circuit how best to implement procedural
improvements to promote certainty, consistency, and reviewability to this area of the law”). 
60. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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that, even where uncertainty remains, that uncertainty is predictable
(for example, deference, perhaps sub rosa, may continue to creep into
appellate review, just as it does in other cases of mixed question of
law and fact). However, the law governing the allocation of
interpretative power between the courts and the PTO remains
underdeveloped.
Mere fragments of case law address the standard by which courts
review administrative interpretations, and those fragments are not
consistent. In some cases, the Federal Circuit has afforded deference
to PTO claim interpretations. For example, In re Morris held that a
court reviewing a PTO claim interpretation should determine merely
“whether the PTO’s interpretation of the disputed claim language is
‘reasonable.’”61 Also, in American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa &
Sons, the Federal Circuit held that, where a patent is challenged on
the basis of prior art references considered by the PTO, the party
challenging the patent must “overcom[e] the deference that is due to
a qualified government agency” which is “assumed to have some
expertise in interpreting the references.”62 Other cases, however, state
that the courts should review administrative claim constructions de
novo.63 Neither set of cases provides an extended discussion of the
issue nor tries to reconcile the competing line of cases. The courts
61. 127 F.3d 1048, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The Morris court also held that nothing in
Markman required a change in the PTO’s claim construction methodology. Id. at 1053-54. See
also In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (applying “clearly erroneous” standard
to an anticipation issue that turned on the proper construction of the word “computer” in the
applicant’s claims).
62. 725 F.2d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1984). See also Ultra-Tex Surfaces, Inc. v. Hill Bros.
Chem. Co., 204 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2000). In addition to the PTO’s interpretive
expertise, the statutory presumption of validity in 35 U.S.C. § 282 has been cited as a basis for
this deference. See Kloster Speedsteel Ab v. Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1571 (Fed. Cir.
1986); Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 755 F.2d 1549, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
63. See, e.g., Gechter v. Winter, 116 F.3d 1454, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (applying, in an
appeal from the PTO, the rule that “[c]laim construction is a question of law and therefore
reviewed de novo.”); In re Donaldson Co., Inc., 16 F.3d 1189, 1192 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (in banc)
(holding, in an appeal from the agency, that “claim construction, where, as here, there are no
underlying factual issues, is also a question of law that we review de novo”). See also Credle v.
Bond, 25 F.3d 1566, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“The proper interpretation of [an interference]
count, like the proper interpretation of a claim, is a question of law that this court reviews de
novo.”); Davis v. Loesch, 998 F.2d 963, 967 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“Interpretation of an interference
count is a question of law, which we review de novo.”). Cf. In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459 (Fed.
Cir. 1994) (holding that the PTO is bound by the judicial interpretation of a claim once it has
been finally litigated in an infringement action).
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simply have not yet devoted much attention to the issue.
Determining the appropriate standard for review of administrative
claim interpretations may, at first glance, seem complicated by the
doctrine that, in passing on patent applications, the PTO must “give
claim language its broadest reasonable interpretation.”64 This doctrine
does not, however, mean that the courts and the agency employ
different methods of claim construction. Both institutions apply the
“broadest reasonable interpretation” method to construe claims not
yet issued.65 The justification for the interpretive method is that,
“when claims can be amended, ambiguities should be recognized,
scope and breadth of language explored, and clarification imposed.”66
Where that justification does not apply, both institutions apply
ordinary rules of claim construction. Thus, for example, the PTO
would not use the “broadest reasonable interpretation” method in
construing the claims of issued prior art patents, and as American
Hoist demonstrates, the courts still presume that the agency has
interpretive expertise.67
In developing more coherent doctrine to govern review of
administrative claim constructions, the courts should resort to general
administrative law governing judicial review of agency decisions.68
64. Morris, 127 F.3d at 1053 (citations omitted). See also In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 833
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (“It is axiomatic that, in proceedings before the PTO, claims in an application
are to be given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification.”)
(citations omitted).
65. In re Kebrich, 201 F.2d 951, 954 (C.C.P.A. 1953) (“Whatever may be the practice of
the courts in the interpretation of claims in infringement proceedings in order to sustain patents
once granted, it is very definitely settled by a line of consistent decisions rendered during a long
period of time that . . . the tribunals [of the Patent Office] and the reviewing courts in the initial
consideration of patentability will give claims the broadest interpretation which, within reason,
may be applied.”).
66. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Quigg, 822 F.2d 1581, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1987). See also In
re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1405 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (noting that “the thought” behind interpreting
unissued claims broadly is “to reduce the possibility that, after the patent is granted, the claims
may be interpreted as giving broader coverage than is justified”). Because the ability to amend
the claims is key, the broadest possible interpretation methodology is applied in reissue and
reexamination proceedings where claims are also subject to amendment. See In re Yamamoto,
740 F.2d 1569, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (applying doctrine to reexamination proceedings because
the patentee had “an opportunity during reexamination in the PTO to amend his claims to
correspond with his contribution to the art”); In re Reuter, 651 F.2d 751 (C.C.P.A. 1981)
(applying the broadest reasonable interpretation doctrine to reissue proceedings).
67. See American Hoist, 725 F.2d at 1359.
68. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 119 S. Ct. 1816, 1819 (1999) (stressing “the importance of
Washington University Open Scholarship
211.doc 08/24/00
128 Re-Engineering Patent Law [Vol. 2:109
That law almost certainly dictates a deferential standard of review.
The key point is that, unlike appellate review of lower court decisions
on mixed questions of law and fact, judicial review of agency
decisions on such questions is ordinarily subject to a rule of
deference.69 This is not to say that the administrative law governing
review of mixed questions is free from uncertainty; it is not.
Throughout the entire twentieth century, courts and commentators
endlessly debated the proper approach to judicial review of
administrative determinations on mixed questions.70 Yet though
maintaining a uniform approach to judicial review of administrative action” and holding that
judicial review of the PTO should be governed by the general “court/agency review standards”
supplied by statute).
69. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944) (holding that, where
the “question is one of specific application of a broad statutory term in a proceeding in which
the agency administering the statute must determine it initially”— a question frequently thought
to be mixed question of law and fact— “the reviewing court’s function is limited” to
determining whether the agency’s decision “has ‘warrant in the record’ and a reasonable basis
in law”); Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 501 (1943) (holding that, in reviewing
“mixed questions of law and fact,” the court should adhere to the rule that “the judicial function
is exhausted when there is found to be a rational basis for the conclusions approved by the
administrative body”) (internal quotations omitted); ICC v. Union Pacific R.R., 222 U.S. 541,
547 (1912) (“In determining these mixed questions of law and fact, the court confines itself to
the ultimate question as to whether the Commission acted within its power. It will not consider
the expediency or wisdom of the order, or whether, on like testimony, it would have made a
similar ruling.”); Public Utilities Comm’n v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 900 F.2d
269, 275 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (noting the rule that the courts “owe deference to an agency’s
decision on a mixed question of fact and law”); San Diego Newspaper Guild v. NLRB, 548
F.2d 863, 867 (9th Cir. 1977) (noting that agency decision is entitled to “great weight by the
courts” if “it is a finding on a mixed question of law and fact which is within the particular
expertise of the [agency]”); see also BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 10.32, at
698 (3d ed. 1991) (noting that whether an issue “is viewed as one of fact or one on a mixed
question of law and fact, the agency is entitled to deference”).
70. Judicial efforts to define the appropriate approach to, and the appropriate terminology
for, administrative decisions on mixed questions of law and fact include Justice Jackson’s
acknowledgment of mixed questions in Dobson, 320 U.S. at 501; Justice Frankfurter’s attempt
to divide law and fact in Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488, 499 (1940) (Frankfurther, J.,
concurring); and Judge Friendly’s three-tiered approach in NLRB v. Marcus Trucking Co., 286
F.2d 583, 590-91 (2d Cir. 1961).
The very recognition of a category for mixed question of law and fact has been
controversial among many commentators. See, e.g., CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., 3
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 12.22, at 206 (1997) (noting that “the line between fact
and law is somewhat ambiguous” but nonetheless criticizing the “unfortunate idea . . . of mixed
question of law and fact”); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 10.36, at 705-06
(3d ed. 1991) (criticizing the terminology of mixed questions of law and fact as “obscur[ing]
the drastic shift in review theory that had occurred”); LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 547 (1965) (criticizing the doctrinal category of mixed question of
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uncertainty reigns in verbal forms and analytic approaches to the
issue, the results of the cases— and the terms of the relevant statutory
law— show that reviewing courts will afford, and should afford,
much greater deference to administrative agencies on mixed
questions of fact and law than to lower courts.
Two explanations for such deference can be provided— one based
on judge-made or common law and the other on statutory law.71 Both
approaches would probably require deference for administrative
claim interpretations, although the issue is a closer one under the
statutory approach.
Under a common-law approach, judicial deference to agency
decisions on mixed questions of fact and law follows a fortiori from
the case law requiring deference to agencies even on pure issues of
law. The force of the administrative common law on this point is well
demonstrated by the current dominance of the so-called Chevron
doctrine, which holds that courts must defer to an agency’s
reasonable construction of an ambiguous statute administered by the
agency.72 Chevron is merely one example of judicial deference to
agency decisions of law. Another is the Seminole Rock doctrine,
which requires courts to grant deference to an agency’s interpretation
of its own regulations.73 A third example is found in the case law
law and fact as “complicat[ing] description of what the court is doing and conceals the true
character of this aspect of judicial review”). See also KENNETH C. DAVIS, 5 ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE §§ 29.9-29.10, at 365-75 (criticizing the approach of the courts as inconsistent).
But after rejecting the terminology of mixed question of law and fact, those commentators
divide into two camps. One camp would recognize deference on issues of law, thereby
decreasing the importance of the law-fact distinction. See, e.g., JAFFE, supra, at 554 (arguing
that “[i]t is appropriate that in certain cases . . . an agency should have primary responsibility
for law-making”). The other would not, thereby increasing the importance of the distinction.
See KOCH, supra, § 12.22, at 205 (endorsing de novo review on issues of law) & § 12.34[1], at
273 (urging courts to “make every effort to separate the two review responsibilities); see also
SCHWARTZ, supra, § 10.36 at 706-08 (similar).
71. These two different approaches can be observed on a wide variety of issues
concerning judicial review of agency action. See John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in
Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113 (1998).
72. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984) (“[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for
the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”);
id. at 844 (holding that the court “may not substitute its own construction of a statutory
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency”).
73. Bowles v. Seminole Rock Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945) (holding that courts must
defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations unless the interpretation “is plainly
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requiring courts to defer to administrative interpretation of
contracts.74 Such broad doctrines of deference on legal issues are
unknown in the law governing appellate review of lower courts.75
The common law consistently stresses agency expertise as a
principle reason for courts to grant deference to agency
determinations of law.76 In the case of claim interpretation, Federal
Circuit case law already recognizes that the PTO has the interpretive
expertise that is the necessary predicate for deference.77 Deference to
agency expertise in claim interpretation is particularly appropriate
because the language of claims is “highly technical in many
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation”). See also Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512
U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (describing the “broad deference” due to an agency’s interpretation of its
regulations); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965) (applying Seminole Rock and holding
that “deference is even more clearly in order” for an agency’s construction of its regulations
than for its statutory interpretations). Cf. Allentown Mack Sales and Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 528
U.S. 359, 377 (1998) (stating that judicial review of an agency’s interpretation of its own rules
is governed by the arbitrary and capricious test of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A)).
74. See, e.g., Williams Natural Gas Co. v. FERC, 3 F.3d 1544, 1549-51 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(holding that deference is due to an agency’s contractual interpretation even where the contract
did not need the agency’s approval to take effect); Northwest Pipeline Corp. v. FERC, 61 F.3d
1479, 1486 (10th Cir. 1995) (adopting the D.C. Circuit’s holding in Williams Natural Gas);
National Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. FERC, 811 F.2d 1563, 1570 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (relying on
Chevron to hold that courts must presume that the agency’s contract interpretation “profits from
familiarity with the field of enterprise to which the contract pertains” and that therefore
deference must be granted to an administrative interpretation of a contract within an agency’s
regulatory field) (quoting Kansas City v. FERC, 723 F.2d 82, 87 (D.C. Cir. 1983)); Western
Union Tel. v. FCC, 541 F.2d 346, 351 (3d Cir. 1976) (rejecting the argument that an agency’s
application of “general common law precepts of contract construction” is not entitled to
deference and holding that courts should employ deferential review when a contract “falls
within the ambit of the [agency’s] expertise” notwithstanding “the fact that these are private
agreements”).
75. Indeed, deference to lower court decisions on issues of law is so unusual that the
Supreme Court overturned a very modest doctrine that permitted courts of appeals to afford
some formal deference to lower court decisions of state law. See Salve Regina College v.
Russell, 499 U.S. 225 (1991).
76. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 512 (noting that “broad deference” to
an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation “is all the more warranted when, as here, the
regulation concerns a complex and highly technical regulatory program”) (citations omitted);
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (noting “technical and complex” nature of the regulatory scheme as a
reason justifying deference to the agency’s statutory construction); National Fuel Gas Supply,
811 F.2d at 1570 (justifying deference to an agency’s construction of a contract on a
presumption that the agency’s construction will be influenced by its “expertise in the technical
language of that field and by its greater knowledge of industry conditions and practices”).
77. See American Hoist, 725 F.2d at 1359; Ultra-Tex Surfaces, 204 F.3d at 1367.
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respects.”78 Furthermore, the agency itself has been responsible for
“develop[ing] a complex and rigid code of rules” to govern claim
format,79 and although courts have also influenced claim format, the
Supreme Court has identified the PTO as the institution having
“primacy” in ensuring the proper coverage of claims.80 Finally, while
the Federal Circuit also has expertise in claim interpretation, such
expertise is not a sufficient reason, under the case law, to deny
deference to the agency.81 Thus, under the judge-made administrative
law, the expertise and authority of the PTO would almost certainly
establish the prerequisites for judicial deference to the agency’s claim
interpretations, even if claim interpretation is considered a “pure”
issue of law.
An alternative approach to determining the proper standards for
judicial review focuses on the relevant statutory law. As I have noted
in another article, judge-made administrative law is not always
consistent with statutory law and, though the courts are beginning to
reconcile the two bodies of law by changing or abandoning judge-
made law not grounded in statutory law, differences between the two
approaches remain.82 Nowhere is this troubling divergence more
evident than in the standards of review for questions of law.
78. Markman, 517 U.S. at 389 (quoting William R. Woodward, Definiteness and
Particularity in Patent Claims, 46 MICH. L. REV. 755, 765 (1948)).
79. Karl B. Lutz, Evolution of the Claims of U.S. Patents, 20 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 457, 488 (1938).
80. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 33.
81. In United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., the Supreme Court held that the Court of
International Trade (CIT)— and, on appeal the Federal Circuit— must apply the Chevron
doctrine even though the CIT has both a nationwide jurisdiction and “expertise . . . in making
complex determinations in a specialized area of the law.” 119 S. Ct. 1392, 1400 (1999).
Similarly, the D.C. Circuit has consistently granted deference to the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission’s contract interpretations, even though that the Circuit has a nationwide (albeit
nonexclusive) jurisdiction over that agency and some expertise in the field. See supra note 74
(D.C. Circuit cases deferring to FERC contractual interpretations); 15 U.S.C. § 3416 (1997)
(granting the D.C. Circuit nonexclusive nationwide jurisdiction to review FERC orders). The
Supreme Court’s decision in Haggar also undermines any argument that the courts should not
defer to the PTO’s patent claim construction because the patent laws “express[] Congress’
intent that the courts should play a fully independent role in interpret[ation].” National Fuel
Gas Supply Corp., 811 F.2d at 1571 (providing possible exception to the rule that courts should
defer to agency interpretations of contracts). The Haggar court rejected an argument that the
Chevron doctrine was inapplicable due to 28 U.S.C. § 2643, which requires the CIT “to reach
the correct decision” in reviewing custom orders. See 119 S. Ct. at 1399.
82. See generally Duffy, supra note 71.
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Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides
that “the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law,
interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the
meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.”83 Section
706’s text, structure, legislative history, and even judicial
interpretations— when the courts look to this statute rather than their
own common law— all confirm that this provision requires courts to
apply a de novo standard of review to issues of law.84 Thus, unlike
the standard for appellate review of trial court decisions of law, the
standard for judicial review of agency legal decisions has been fixed
by statute.85
In deciding the proper standard of review for claim
interpretations, a court could make the following simple syllogism:
Since § 706 requires de novo review on questions of law, and since
claim interpretation is a question of law, § 706 requires de novo
review of claim interpretations. This logic would be flawed, however,
because claim interpretation should not be considered purely a
“question[] of law” for purposes of § 706.86
Section 706 does not define what constitutes a “question[] of
law,” although the structure of the statute implies that “interpret[ing]
constitutional and statutory provisions, and determin[ing] the
meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action” should be
considered questions of law for the courts.87 Of those categories,
claim interpretation comes closest to “determin[ing] the meaning and
applicability of the terms of an agency action.”88 Yet claims are
written by the patent applicant or the applicant’s attorney, not the
agency. Indeed, in cases reviewing a denial of a patent application— a
typical situation where a court might review an administrative claim
interpretation— the agency has rejected the claims, so it would be
difficult to view them as the agency’s action.
Because § 706 does not define what constitutes a “question[] of
83. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994) (emphasis added).
84. See Duffy, supra note 71, at 193-95.
85. Cf. supra note 52 and accompanying text (noting that no statutory law governs
standard for appellate review of trial court legal decisions).
86. 5 U.S.C. § 706.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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law,” the courts would almost certainly rely on functional or policy
considerations to classify a “mongrel practice,” such as claim
interpretation, that falls “somewhere between a pristine legal standard
and a simple historical fact.”89 The policy analysis follows the same
pattern as in Markman and (to the limited extent that the court
discussed policy) in Cybor. But here, the relevant factors tilt the
analysis in favor of deference. Unlike a jury, the PTO is not
disadvantaged compared to the courts in either expertise or ability to
achieve national uniformity.90 Indeed, the agency is probably superior
to the courts on both points. Because of its “primacy” in ensuring the
proper coverage of claims,91 the PTO interprets claims far more
frequently than any court, including the Federal Circuit, and therefore
possesses at least a quantitative expertise not duplicated in the
judiciary. The agency also establishes national uniformity whenever
it interprets a claim, whereas the courts achieve uniformity only in
appellate interpretations. Thus, unlike in Cybor, where national
uniformity favored classifying claim construction as a question of
law subject to de novo review, here the policy cuts against such a
classification.
If claim construction does not constitute a “question[] of law” for
purposes of § 706, deference to the agency’s claim interpretations
would be due under several theories. For example, the courts could
treat the issue as a mixed question of law and fact subject to review
89. 517 U.S. at 378, 388 (internal quotations omitted). Administrative law commentators
have long supported having the law-fact distinction turn on policy considerations. See Davis,
supra note 70, § 29.14, at 393 (urging courts to use “comparative qualifications” analysis in
determining whether to grant deference to an agency’s decision on mixed questions of law and
fact); JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES 55 (1927) (noting that there is “no fixed distinction” between law and fact, and
that “[t]he knife of policy alone effects an artificial cleavage at the point where the court
chooses to draw the line between public interest and private right”). The Federal Circuit has
expressly adopted such an approach in determining the proper standard for judicial review of
mixed questions. See Campbell v. Merit Systems Protection Bd., 27 F.3d 1560, 1565 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (“balanc[ing] considerations of judicial economy, comparative institutional advantage
(e.g., the relative expertise of agencies and relative non-expertise of juries vis-a-vis judges), and
constitutional concerns (e.g., the separation of powers in administrative appeals, and the right of
trial by jury in actions at law) against the effect of appellate deference on consistency and
uniformity in the law” in determining whether to classify issue as law or fact for purposes of
judicial review of agency decision).
90. Cf. Markman, 517 U.S. at 388-91.
91. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 33.
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only under Section 706(2)(A)’s arbitrary and capricious test.92
Alternatively, courts could try to separate the factual and legal
components in claim interpretation, granting deference, for example,
to explicit agency findings concerning the meaning of terms to
persons skilled in the art,93 but reviewing de novo more general
matters such as the agency’s interpretive method.94 Other approaches
are possible, but provided that claim construction is not classified as a
pure question of law, § 706 requires a reviewing court to afford
deference to the agency.
A statutory approach to determining the proper standard of
judicial review leads to one final point concerning claim
construction: The courts must afford proper respect to the agency’s
rules concerning claim interpretation. Where Congress has conferred
an administrative power to make rules, the agency has power to
92. Section 706 has no provision expressly governing mixed questions of fact and law, but
the arbitrary and capricious test in § 706(2)(A) has been interpreted as a catch-all provision
applicable to all agency decisions not covered by more specific provisions in § 706. See Ass’n
of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Board of Governors, 745 F.2d 677, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Scalia, J.). Applying the arbitrary and capricious test to mixed questions of law and fact would
be a sensible interpretation of § 706, in part because it would be consistent with the case law
prior to the enactment of the APA. Under that case law, courts reviewed mixed questions of law
and fact to ensure that the agency’s decision had a rational basis or, equivalently, a warrant in
the record and a reasonable basis in law. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications Inc., 322 U.S. 111,
131 (1944); ICC v. Union Pacific R.R., 222 U.S. 541, 547 (1912). While the judicial review
provisions of the APA do not restate earlier judge-made law, they also were not intended to
depart dramatically from pre-existing law. See Duffy, supra note 71, at 119. Absent evidence in
the text, structure or legislative history of the statute, an interpretation of § 706 that reconciles
pre-existing law should be marginally preferred over other interpretations.
93. Section 706 provides that issues of fact shall be reviewed under a deferential standard,
excepting certain rare circumstances not present in the patent system. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E)
(authorizing judicial review of agency determinations of fact reached in certain proceedings
under a “substantial evidence” test); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (generally authorizing reviewing
courts to overturn “arbitrary” and “capricious” agency decisions). See also Dickinson v. Zurko,
119 S. Ct. 1816 (1999) (holding that judicial review of PTO factual findings must use either the
substantial evidence or the arbitrary and capricious test of § 706). For a discussion of the rare
circumstances in which the APA authorizes de novo review of facts, see Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971).
94. Thus, under this theory, a court would not defer if the agency’s method of construing
claims were inconsistent with statutory law. See, e.g., In re Donaldson Co., Inc., 16 F.3d 1189
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (in banc) (holding the PTO’s interpretation of “means-plus-function” claims
violated 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6). See also R. Carl Moy, The Interpretation of Means Expressions
During Prosecution, 68 J. PAT & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 246 (1986) (identifying the
divergence between the statutory law governing “means-plus-function” claims and the agency’s
interpretive method).
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“prescribe law” within the ambit of the rulemaking authorization.95
Although the PTO does not possess a substantive rulemaking
power,96 it does have the power to make rules governing “the conduct
of [its] proceedings.”97 In at least some circumstances, the PTO
should be able to rely on that power to create rules governing the
drafting and interpreting of claims.98
The cases have not yet discussed much of this in detail. But
attention to the standard for judicial review of administrative claim
interpretations is an obvious next step in the wake of Markman,
Cybor, and the general increase in attention to the legal process of
claim interpretation. The remainder of this article will consider the
effect that administrative claim interpretations should have in
infringement litigation (part II), and the possibility that legal process
issues can be resolved less on ad hoc guesstimates of policy and more
on objective criteria (part III).
95. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1996) (equating an agency’s power to make rules as a power to
“prescribe law”). Describing such respect for the agency’s lawmaking power as “deference” to
the agency’s interpretations of law is potentially confusing because of the apparent conflict with
§ 706's rule of de novo review on questions of law. Nonetheless it is accurate to say that even
though the courts review question of law de novo, they are sometimes bound by agency
decisions on legal issues. They are bound because, in construing the statutory law de novo, they
discover that the statute gives the agency authority to make the relevant legal rule. See Duffy,
supra note 71, at 202 (noting that “[t]he illusion of deference is created by the agency’s
delegated authority to fill in the details of the statute, which will affect a court’s interpretation
of the more general language in the statute”). This approach reconciles § 706 with a large part
of the Chevron case law, and it appears to be gaining acceptance as the courts retreat from
fashioning administrative common law without consideration of the relevant statutory law. See
Haggar Apparel, 119 S. Ct. at 1399 (noting that de novo review on issues of law is not
necessarily inconsistent with Chevron because “[v]alid regulations establish legal norms”).
96. As the Federal Circuit has held, the absence of a substantive rulemaking power makes
the Chevron doctrine inapplicable to the PTO’s interpretations on the substance of the Patent
Act. Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1996). See also Duffy, supra note 71, at
204-05 (identifying Merck as a decision that correctly limits the Chevron doctrine to cases in
which the agency has exercised a rulemaking power).
97. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2000).
98. The PTO might even be able to use its rulemaking power to change preexisting rules
of claim interpretation developed by the courts. Recognition of such a power would not allow
the agency to “flout[] judicial precedent.” Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473, 479 n.2 (Fed. Cir.
1997). Like enactment of a new statute, promulgation of a valid rule changes the applicable
law, and the case law developed prior to the promulgation of the rule could not have considered
the effect of that change. See id. (sustaining agency’s procedural rules because prior “case law
did not deal with” the relevant legal situation).
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II. A TABLEAU OF ALTERNATIVES: PRIMARY JURISDICTION AND
ADMINISTRATIVE CLAIM INTERPRETATIONS IN OTHER PATENT
SYSTEMS
Confronted with a choice between a procedural rule that would
further nationally uniform claim interpretations versus a rule likely to
be less costly, the judges in Cybor chose national uniformity despite
the expense. Yet perhaps this dilemma can be avoided altogether.
As seen in the previous section, conventional principles of
administrative law almost certainly require the courts to defer to the
PTO’s expertise in interpreting patent claims. Unlike deference to a
decentralized system of trial courts, deference to an administrative
agency does not undermine national uniformity in claim
interpretation. Indeed, a traditional reason for resorting to
administrative processes is to achieve national uniformity quickly and
inexpensively.99 Thus, the dilemma in Cybor can be avoided to the
extent that trial courts can obtain administrative claim interpretations.
As shown in subpart A below, a standard doctrine of administrative
law— the primary jurisdiction doctrine— permits and sometimes even
requires that courts seek administrative opinions in circumstances
quite analogous to those present in infringement trials. Subpart B
examines the patent law of other countries and finds that, in many,
statutory law already expressly provides for patent infringement
courts to obtain advisory opinions from national or international
patent offices. In sum, the primary jurisdiction doctrine could provide
a practical solution to the procedural difficulties confronting
infringement courts, and it is a solution similar to procedures found in
the patent law of other industrialized countries.
A. The Administrative Law Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction and Its
Application to Patent Claim Interpretation
The primary jurisdiction doctrine in administrative law governs
99. See JAMES L. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 33 (1938) (noting that the
growth of administrative processes occurred in part because “it seemed desirable to have some
uniformity in approach, a uniformity that under the judicial process could only be attained by
the time-consuming and expensive process of appeals to the court of last resort”).
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situations where a court has jurisdiction over a case but an
administrative decision on some issue may be helpful, or necessary,
for the judicial resolution of the case.100 Because issues implicating
the expertise of an administrative agency can arise in a variety of
different situations, the Supreme Court has stressed that “[n]o fixed
formula exists for applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,”101
and both the courts and commentators agree that much of the
doctrine’s strength lies in its flexibility and pragmatism.102
The general procedures associated with the doctrine are easily
described. Once it decides to invoke the doctrine, a court “enable[s] a
‘referral’ to the agency” by giving the parties a “reasonable
opportunity to seek an administrative ruling” on an issue relevant to
the case before the court.103 Such a “reasonable opportunity” can be
afforded by granting a stay of proceedings or, in the court’s
discretion, by other means.104 Importantly, “referral of the issue to the
administrative agency does not deprive the court of jurisdiction.”105
The court retains power to regulate all aspects of the doctrine and
may even establish a time limit beyond which the court will proceed
without the agency’s ruling.106
United States v. Western Pacific Railroad Co.,107 one of the most
100. See United States v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 63-64 (1956) (“‘Primary
jurisdiction’ . . . applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into
play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a
regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body
. . . .”); see also Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 268 (1993) (noting that primary jurisdiction “is
a doctrine specifically applicable to claims properly cognizable in court that contain some issue
within the special competence of an administrative agency”).
101. Western Pacific, 352 U.S. at 64. See also Louis L. Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, 77
HARV. L. REV. 1037, 1037 (1964) (“The so-called doctrine of primary jurisdiction cannot be
stated in the form of a rule in terms either of its analytic structure or of its incidence.”).
102. See, e.g., Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. Modern Air Transp., Inc., 179 F.2d 622, 625 (2d
Cir. 1950) (“[T]he outstanding feature of the doctrine is properly said to be its flexibility
permitting the courts to make a workable allocation of business between themselves and the
agencies.”) (citations omitted); LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION 121 (1965) (same).
103. Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 268 (1993).
104. Id. at 268-69 (noting that the court “has discretion either to retain jurisdiction or, if the
parties would not be disadvantaged, to dismiss the case with prejudice”).
105. Id. at 268.
106. American Auto. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Massachusetts Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 163 F.3d 74,
81-82, 86-87 (1st Cir. 1998) (imposing limit on time that the court will wait for agency action).
107. Western Pacific, 352 U.S. 59 (1956).
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famous primary jurisdiction cases, has obvious parallels to a typical
patent infringement action. Western Pacific involved a dispute over
railroad rate tariffs that, like patent claims, are specialized legal texts
ordinarily drafted by private parties but filed with, and subject to
approval by, an administrative agency. As with patent claims,
“[e]very question of the construction of a tariff is deemed a question
of law.”108 In Western Pacific, the United States shipped napalm
bombs without their fuses and burster charges, and the Western
Pacific Railroad charged the rate for “incendiary bombs” listed in the
railroad’s tariffs.109 The government refused to pay the full amount
charged, however, because it believed that the railroad’s lower rate
for “gasoline in steel drums” applied to the defused napalm
shipment.110
In the suit brought by the railroad in the Court of Claims, a central
issue was whether the defused napalm bombs constituted “incendiary
bombs” or merely “gasoline in steel drums” within the meaning of
the tariffs filed by the railroad with the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC).111 Without seeking any administrative assistance,
a divided Court of Claims construed the railroad’s tariffs against the
government,112 but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that “the
interests of a uniform and expert administration of the regulatory
scheme” required the courts to afford the ICC an opportunity to pass
on the proper construction of the tariff.113 In particular, the Court
stressed that railroad tariffs are “[c]omplex and technical” and that
properly construing them requires a “familiarity . . . possessed not by
108. Great N. Ry. Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 290 (1922).
109. Western Pacific, 352 U.S. at 60.
110. Id. at 61. Though its argument was rejected by the Court of Claims, and ultimately by
the ICC too, see United States v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 309 ICC 249 (1959), the government
had reasonable grounds for contending that its shipment should not be classified as incendiary
bombs. Napalm is merely gasoline thickened by the addition of aluminum soap powder; like
gasoline it is inflammable but not self-igniting. See 352 U.S. at 60. Without burster charges and
fuses, a shipment of napalm inside steel bomb casings does not seem to present risks different
than gasoline in steel drums. See id. at 61 n.3.
111. 309 ICC at 250-51.
112. Western Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 919 (Ct. Cl. 1955). Two of the
five judges on the Court of Claims dissented as to the proper construction of the railroad’s
tariff, but none of the judges considered referring the tariff construction issue to the ICC. Id. at
920-21.
113. Western Pacific, 352 U.S. at 65.
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the courts but by the agency which had the exclusive power to pass
on the [tariff] in the first instance.”114
The Western Pacific Court made clear, however, that tariff
construction was not invariably a matter on which a court must first
seek an administrative opinion.115 In an earlier case, Great Northern
Railway Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co., the Court held that the
construction of a tariff need not be referred to the ICC where the
words of the tariff “were used in their ordinary sense” and no
extrinsic evidence was offered to prove a “peculiar meaning,” to
define “technical words or phrases not commonly understood,” or “to
establish a usage of trade or locality.”116 While Western Pacific
reaffirmed the result in Great Northern, it also stressed that a judicial
decision to invoke the primary jurisdiction doctrine must be “based
on the particular facts of each case.”117 “In every case,” the Court
reasoned, “the question is whether the reasons for the existence of the
doctrine are present and whether the purposes it serves will be aided
by its application in the particular litigation.”118 The reasons
identified by the Court for the doctrine were the need for achieving a
“desirable uniformity” and the practical utility of calling upon “the
expert and specialized knowledge of the agencies.”119 Thus, even
where an administrative opinion may serve merely “as a premise for
114. Id. at 66-67.
115. Id. at 69 (“By no means do we imply that matters of tariff construction are never
cognizable in the courts.”).
116. 259 U.S. 285, 294, 291-92 (1922). A referral to the ICC would not have been justified
in Great Northern because the issue in the case was not difficult. Under the relevant tariff, a
special charge was due if a shipper diverted railroad cars to a new destination, unless the
diversion was incident to an inspection of the shipment. See id. at 288-89. The shipper in Great
Northern supplied new destination orders immediately after its railroad cars of grain were
inspected, but nevertheless the railroad assessed the diversion charge. Id. at 288. All of the
judges in lower courts agreed that the shipper’s actions fell within the inspection exception and
that the railroad’s assessment was not consistent with the tariff. See Merchants’ Elevator Co. v.
Great N. Ry. Co., 180 N.W. 105, 106 (1920) (unanimously affirming trial court decision in
favor of the shipper).
117. 352 U.S. at 69.
118. Id. at 64. Because primary jurisdiction requires a fact-intensive inquiry, the Western
Pacific Court remanded a companion case so that the court below could determine “what kinds
of factors are involved” in the disputed issue of tariff construction and whether those factors
required a preliminary resort to the expertise of the agency. See United States v. Chesapeake &
Ohio Ry. Co., 352 U.S. 77, 80-81 (1956). 
119. Western Pacific, 352 U.S. at 64.
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legal consequences to be judicially defined,” as in matters of tariff or
claim construction, “uniformity and consistency” are better secured
“by preliminary resort for ascertaining and interpreting the
circumstances underlying legal issues to agencies that are better
equipped than courts by specialization, by insight gained through
experience, and by more flexible procedure.”120
Western Pacific, Great Northern, and other cases applying
primary jurisdiction to issues of tariff construction do not, of course,
dictate that the primary jurisdiction doctrine must apply to patent
claim construction. Tariff construction and claim construction could
be distinguished on many grounds, not the least of which is that the
ICC, the relevant administrative agency in the Supreme Court cases
on tariff construction, possessed broader discretionary powers within
its regulatory jurisdiction than the PTO has under its statutory
mandate. But such distinctions are insufficient to prove the doctrine
inapplicable, because the very flexibility of the primary jurisdiction
doctrine makes it adaptable to a wide range of circumstances. A
recent decision of the First Circuit proves the point.
In American Automobile Manufacturers Association v.
Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (AAMA),
the First Circuit applied the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to the
issue of whether a provision of the federal Clean Air Act preempts a
Massachusetts statute requiring automakers to manufacture a certain
number of electric vehicles.121 The case involved a suit by auto
manufacturers to enjoin the State from enforcing its statute. The
district court granted an injunction, but on appeal, the First Circuit
stayed proceedings for 180 days to give the Environmental Protection
Agency, the agency with jurisdiction over the Clean Air Act, an
opportunity to opine on the preemptive effect of the federal statute.122
Even where a disputed “issue is primarily one of statutory
interpretation,” the court reasoned, “referral of that matter to the
120. Id. at 64-65 (quoting Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574-75
(1952)). For another case in which the Court held that an issue of tariff construction fell within
the primary jurisdiction of the ICC, see Texas and Pacific Ry. Co. v. American Tie & Timber
Co., 234 U.S. 138 (1914) (holding that the ICC must decide whether a railroad tariff for
“lumber” applied to a shipment of oak railroad ties). 
121. 163 F.3d 74, 80-81 (1st Cir. 1998).
122. Id. at 86-87.
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agency with primary jurisdiction may also be generally advisable in
precisely those circumstances in which a court would defer to the
agency’s interpretation pursuant to [the Chevron doctrine].”123 A
referral has its costs, the court noted, because the referral for an
administrative ruling has “the potential for delay.”124 The flexibility
of the doctrine, however, allows a court to minimize the costs of
delay. The court can, as the First Circuit did, impose a deadline, after
which time the court will decide the issue without administrative
assistance if the agency has not acted.125
The First Circuit’s decision in AAMA shows that the primary
jurisdiction doctrine can be applied even where an administrative
ruling is not a prerequisite to judicial action, and even where the
relevant issue involves statutory interpretation or some other legal
question for which the courts have traditionally held greater
responsibility than agencies. While the AAMA court held that it
would grant Chevron deference to the agency’s views, deference is
not an absolute necessity to trigger the doctrine. In its weakest form,
the primary jurisdiction doctrine simply reminds courts that they can,
through a variety of formal and informal techniques, seek the views
of an executive branch agency when those views might be helpful.
This weak version of the doctrine can be seen as analogous to the
Supreme Court’s practice of inviting the Solicitor General to file
amicus briefs in cases presenting significant issues of federal law. In
such cases, the Court does not defer to the Solicitor General’s views,
123. Id. at 81 (citations omitted).
124. Id.
125. 163 F.3d at 81-82. See also id. at 86-87 (providing that “if no agency ruling is
forthcoming within 180 days . . . [the court] will then decide the issues before [it] without the
EPA’s guidance”). The agency responded to the court by letter on September 15, 1999. See
Association of Int’l Auto. Mfrs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 196 F.3d 302 (1st Cir. 1999). The First
Circuit has continued its stay pending an appeal by the automobile manufacturers that was filed
in the D.C. Circuit. Id. at 306. The First Circuit was concerned that a conflict between it and the
D.C. Circuit could arise if the later entertained the appeal by the manufacturers, even though the
possibility of such a conflict seems remote. Id. at 305. Obvious inefficiency and delay would
result if the D.C. Circuit heard appeals from all agency rulings issued in response to referrals
from courts under the primary jurisdiction doctrine. Moreover, the judicial review provisions of
the Administrative Procedure Act confer a right of action only where “there is no other
adequate remedy in a court,” 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1994), and review by the court referring the
matter to the agency (e.g., by the First Circuit in AAMA) would seem to be a remedy “adequate”
enough to deprive the litigants of a cause of action in any other court.
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but it asks for them nonetheless because the Solicitor General’s
expertise in interpreting federal law may provide assistance to the
Court.126
Nor is judicial power to seek expert assistance limited to inviting
amicus briefs. As the Supreme Court noted early in the twentieth
century, “[c]ourts have (at least in the absence of legislation to the
contrary) inherent power to provide themselves with appropriate
instruments required for the performance of their duties,” and that
power includes authority to obtain assistance from specialists “to aid
judges in the performance of specific judicial duties, as they may
arise in the progress of a cause.”127 Courts continue to use this power
to appoint nonwitness experts in appropriate cases.128 In its weaker
forms, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction merely affords courts
slightly greater latitude in seeking assistance from expert
administrative agencies in the Executive Branch than from
nongovernmental expert assistants.129
126. See ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 397 (6th ed. 1986) (noting
that the Court’s practice is to request the Solicitor General’s views where they “are felt to be
relevant to the Court’s consideration of the case”).
127. Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312-14 (1920) (approving court appointment of an
auditor); see also id. at 314 (noting that the “inherent power of a federal court to invoke such
aid is the same whether the court sits in equity or at law”).
128. See, e.g., Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 154-56 (1st Cir. 1988) (approving a
district court’s use of an economist as a “technical advisor” to assist the court in calculating
damages and holding that, if such technical advisors do not provide any evidence in the case,
they are not subject to Federal Rule of Evidence 706, which affords rights to depose and cross-
examine court appointed witnesses); MediaCom Corp. v. Rates Technology, Inc., 4 F. Supp. 2d
17, 29-30 (D. Mass. 1998) (relying on Reilly to appoint an expert to assist in claim
construction); Biogen Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., CA No. 95-10496-RGS, Memorandum and Order,
(D. Mass. Dec. 10, 1996) (Stearns, J.), reprinted in MediaCom Corp., 4 F. Supp. 2d at 35-37
(Appendix A) (also appointing an expert to assist in claim construction). In his 1998 address to
the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Justice Breyer praised Judge
Stearns’s decision to appoint an expert in the Biogen litigation. See Stephen Breyer, The
Interdependence of Science and Law, 82 JUDICATURE 24, 27 (1998) (reprinting Justice Breyer’s
address). Compared to judicial appointment of private experts, primary jurisdiction has the
advantage that it eliminates the difficulties in selecting the expert. See id. (noting the problems
associated with a judicial search for, and selection of, a neutral expert). 
129. Though district courts have not yet invoked the primary jurisdiction doctrine, they
have frequently resorted to appointing technical experts or special masters to assist in claim
constructions. See, e.g., MediaCom Corp., 4 F. Supp. 2d at 29-30 (collecting rulings appointing
an expert); Rodime PLC v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 174 F.3d 1294, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting
the district court’s reliance on special master); Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co. Ltd., 102
F.3d 1214, 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting the district court’s use of a special master for claim
construction). The appointment of special masters is, however, limited to “exceptional”
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With this background on primary jurisdiction, we can now
consider the application of the doctrine to patent claim interpretation.
Exxon Chemical Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp.130 presents a fine
example where the primary jurisdiction doctrine could have been
useful. The case involved an Exxon patent on a lubricating oil and, as
in many patent cases, claim interpretation was a crucial issue in the
litigation.131 The interpretive issue was deceptively simple: The
patent claimed an oil “comprising” five substances, and the dispute
was whether the five substances listed in the claims referred to the
ingredients as they existed before they were mixed together or as they
existed within the patented oil after they were mixed together.132 The
issue was important because one of the five ingredients, described in
the claims as an “ashless” (i.e., non-metallic) dispersant, formed a
weak chemical bond with other metal-containing ingredients to an
extent that it could no longer be considered “ashless” within the
lubricating oil.133
Lubrizol, which used all five of the ingredients listed in the patent
to make its lubricant, argued that the patent claims described the
circumstances where the parties do not consent to the appointment. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 53(b).
See also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 955 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (criticizing
the district court’s nonconsensual appointment of a special master as a “deputization of a
vice-judge” and granting mandamus to prevent use of the master). The limitations on court
power to appoint technical experts outside the constraints of Federal Rule of Evidence 706 have
not yet been tested. But some limits are likely to be found, for the practice raises fundamental
concerns of undermining the adversarial processes and of transforming Article III judges into
investigators akin to the inquisitorial magistrates of Continental systems. See MediaCom Corp.,
4 F. Supp. 2d at 30 n.11 (noting, in the course of appointing a technical assistant, that the
Markman hearing process “represents a drift toward the European civil justice system of
adjudication”); Margaret G. Farrell, Coping With Scientific Evidence: The Use of Special
Masters, 43 EMORY L.J. 927, 930 (1994) (noting that the use of special masters to evaluate
scientific information “represents a significant departure from the tenets of our traditional civil
justice system” and moves our system toward “the Continental model”). District courts are not
similarly constrained in invoking the primary jurisdiction doctrine.
130. 64 F.3d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
131. Id. at 1555.
132. Id. Claim one in the patent, which was representative of all other claims at issue in the
case, began with the text “[a] lubricating oil composition suitable as a crankcase lubricant in
internal combustion engines comprising” and then listed the five substances. Id. at 1556
(brackets in original).
133. Id. at 1559-60. A sufficient amount of the formerly ashless dispersant formed a bond
with a metallic component of the mixture that Exxon was unable to prove at trial that the
amount of ashless dispersant left in mixture fell within the percentage weight range specified in
the claims for that component.
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ingredients after they were mixed together; Exxon took the other
position.134 At trial the district judge agreed with Exxon’s
interpretation and so charged the jury, which found willful
infringement.135 In reversing, a divided panel of the Federal Circuit
adopted an interpretation of the claims not argued by either of the
parties. The Federal Circuit held that the claim language referred to
the ingredients after they were mixed together but not necessarily, as
Lubrizol had argued, as they existed in the final lubricant.136 Because
Exxon had not proven that any of Lubrizol’s mixtures, final product
or otherwise, contained the five claimed ingredients after mixture, the
Federal Circuit granted judgment as a matter of law to Lubrizol on
literal infringement.137 Nevertheless, the case went back to district
court for a new trial on a doctrine of equivalents theory.138
Exxon Chemical Patents is an interesting case for a variety of
reasons. First, and most obviously, it shows the potentially high costs
of reversing a claim interpretation employed in a district court— an
extensive, complex trial must be held again. Second, although it has
been cited as an example of why the Federal Circuit should defer to
the claim interpretations of trial judges, Exxon Chemical Patents also
highlights an important drawback of that course, for the trial judge
candidly confessed on the record his “considerable difficulty in
understanding the chemistry and law involved in the case.”139
Third, the case shows how difficult the task of claim construction
can be, or at least, how difficult the task can be for an institution
restricted to the rather limited set of procedures employed in an
appellate forum. A single paragraph contains the entirety of the panel
majority’s reasoning in support of its conclusion that the claims refer
to the ingredients after, not before, mixture.140 Although one of the
two judges in the majority stated in a concurrence that the panel’s
134. 64 F.3d at 1555.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1558.
137. Id. at 1561.
138. See Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 137 F.3d 1475, 1483 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (holding that the appellate mandate in the prior appeal did not preclude a new trial on a
doctrine of equivalents theory).
139. Exxon Chemical Patents, 64 F.3d at 1555.
140. Id. at 1557 (last full paragraph on page).
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interpretation was “unquestionably” correct,141 the dissenter found it
“nothing short of double speak.”142 On petition for rehearing in banc,
one of the court’s two judges holding a Ph.D. in chemistry
condemned the majority’s claim interpretation as “gravely incorrect
. . . as a matter of law, as a matter of chemistry, and as a matter of
patent practice.”143
Yet the most striking point in any of the opinions is the assertion
in the dissent to in banc rehearing that Exxon’s claim form, defining
a composition as “comprising” a list of ingredients, is ubiquitous. It is
employed by “[m]any thousands of chemical patents” and the PTO
continues to issue similarly drafted patents in  a rate of approximately
one hundred per week.144 Those empirical observations, backed as
they were with a fair amount of evidence, lead to the obvious
question: What rights does the PTO think that it is granting when it
issues claims in this format? The answer to this question seems
highly relevant to proper claim interpretation, and it is precisely the
type of information that the primary jurisdiction doctrine allows
courts to obtain from the agency.
Thus, in a case like Exxon Chemical Patents, even the weakest
version of the primary jurisdiction doctrine would have value. It
would provide an expedient way for a district judge unfamiliar with
the complexities of patent claim drafting to obtain an expert opinion
from the executive branch agency that, pursuant to its statutory duty,
must pass upon and, therefore, interpret the claims in every United
States patent.145 Even if the PTO received no judicial deference for its
141. Id. at 1563 (Plager, J., concurring).
142. Id. (Nies, J., dissenting).
143. Exxon Chemical Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 77 F.3d 450, 451 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(Newman, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing in banc). Judge Newman holds a Ph.D. in
chemistry from Yale University. See <http://www.fedcir.gov/judgbios.html> (providing
biographical data). Judge Lourie, the other judge on the Federal Circuit with a Ph.D. in
chemistry (his from the University of Pennsylvania, id.), did not write or join any opinion in
Exxon Chemical Patents.
144. 77 F.3d at 452, 454 (Newman, J., dissenting).
145. Though judicial proceedings are traditionally stayed after a referral to an agency under
the primary jurisdiction doctrine, no stay would be necessary if the referral occurred prior to
trial and the district court set a time limit for agency action consistent with the anticipated start
of trial. See AAMA, 163 F.3d at 86-87 (establishing 180 day deadline for agency action). Since
trial courts typically have scheduled hearings to resolve disputes over claim interpretation (or
“Markman hearings”) prior to trial, referral to the agency need not require any significant
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claim interpretations, the agency’s opinions could still reduce the
number of wasted infringement trials, provided that district courts are
better able to predict the Federal Circuit’s ultimate claim
interpretations with the agency’s opinions than without.146
Exxon Chemical Patents shows, however, that the real value of
the primary jurisdiction doctrine would be realized under stronger,
more traditional versions of the primary jurisdiction doctrine, where
the agency’s interpretation of the legal text receives some judicial
deference. Such deference would obviously produce greater
uniformity in interpretations at the trial level. It may even lead to
greater uniformity at the appellate level since, though the Federal
Circuit is in theory a unified institution, different panels may not
share the same interpretive philosophy. More fundamentally, a case
such as Exxon Chemical Patents demonstrates that a difference
between judicial and administrative claim interpretations can
implicate the statutory presumption of validity afforded to all patent
claims issued by the PTO.147 For if in granting Exxon’s patent, the
PTO interpreted claims as the dissent did, then the court’s
interpretation has substantially nullified, perhaps completely
nullified, the patent claims as they were understood by the agency.
Applying a traditional version of the primary jurisdiction doctrine
would not require a wholesale transfer of authority from the courts to
the agency. Like the tariff interpretation issues in Great Northern,
many issues of patent claim interpretation may require no specialized
technical knowledge or may not be difficult enough to justify the
referral to the agency.148 An example might be found in Markman,
change in the timing of infringement trials. See Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1475 (Rader, J., dissenting)
(noting the timing of Markman hearings). Moreover, the flexibility of administrative processes
should permit the agency to respond to the referral within a reasonable amount of time and
certainly no longer than it would take an appellate court to answer a certified question on claim
construction. Cf. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1479 (Newman, J.) (noting that district courts had tried to
certify disputed questions of claim construction for interlocutory appellate review).
146. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 983 (in banc) (noting that a district court has discretion to
“find guidance” in an expert opinion on claim construction) (citation omitted). Cf. Cyber Corp.,
138 F.3d at 1462 (Plager, J., concurring) (noting that the court of appeals may give weight to a
district court opinion interpreting claims because “four minds may often be better than three
when a complex claim construction is at issue”).
147. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1994) (providing that “[e]ach claim of a patent . . . shall be presumed
valid independently of the validity of the other claims”).
148. See supra notes 72-76 describing traditional role of administrative agencies in
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which presented an interpretive issue that was both relatively
straightforward (none of the judges who interpreted the claims
disagreed with the result) and, unlike the issue in Exxon Chemical
Patents, likely to be unique to the case. Where claim construction
presents more technical questions, courts should refer the issue to the
agency, but the agency’s claim construction, like all agency action,
would still be subject to judicial review pursuant to the APA.149
Successful application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine would,
of course, require that the PTO be amenable to interpreting claims
upon referral from the courts. This is, however, no different than the
ordinary case of primary jurisdiction. As the Supreme Court has
noted, most statutes contain no mechanism whereby a court can
demand a determination from an agency.150 Even in situations where
the agency has no duty to respond to the court’s request for assistance
(as in AAMA), administrative cooperation has been the norm.151 There
is no reason to suspect that the PTO would be less willing to
cooperate than other agencies.152 The agency could insure claim
interpretations of high quality by assigning the task to panels of
examiners-in-chief or administrative patent judges from the Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences.153 Indeed, such a process might
have important collateral benefits for the agency and for the patent
interpreting specialized legal texts).
149. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1994).
150. See Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 268 n.3 (1993).
151. Association of Int’l Auto. Mfrs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 196 F.3d 302, 303-04 (1st Cir.
1999) (noting the EPA’s response to the court’s referral).
152. Express statutory authority is generally not required to issue interpretive rulings, see 5
U.S.C. § 558(b) (1994) (requiring authorization by law only for a “substantive rule or order”
issued by an agency), and in any event, the PTO has broad authority to “conduct programs . . .
regarding domestic and international intellectual property law.” 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(11). Agency
interpretive rulings issued without express statutory authority are entitled to at least the level of
judicial deference outlined in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)— they have a
“power to persuade if lacking power to control.” See Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543,
1550 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (affording Skidmore deference to a PTO interpretive ruling). The PTO
could charge a fee for its interpretive rulings, as its statutory authority to recover its expenses
through fees covers all “services” rendered by the agency. 35 U.S.C. § 42(a)(d) (1994).
153. The Director of the PTO has broad authority to define the duties of the agency’s
officers and employees. See 35 U.S.C. § 3(b)(3)(B) (2000). Although some functions of the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences are statutorily defined, see 35 35 U.S.C. § 6(b), the
Director is not prohibited from assigning additional functions to the Board’s administrative
patent judges.
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system as a whole. Opining on ambiguities in claims may improve
the PTO’s ability to detect and eliminate such ambiguity prior to the
issuance of a patent, which, in turn, would improve the certainty and
reliability of patent rights generally.154
Curiously, application of primary jurisdiction to patent
infringement cases would be consistent with the historical origins of
the doctrine. In the early part of the twentieth century, when primary
jurisdiction was first being formulated in rail tariff cases, one
prominent commentator— Adolf Berle, whose later fame on corporate
law matters overshadowed his earlier work in administrative law—
justified and explained the developing doctrine by analogy to the
requirement in patent law that parties first seek administrative action
in the form of an issued patent prior to suit in court.155 Applying the
now mature law of primary jurisdiction to patent cases brings the
doctrine full circle.
B. Administrative Claim Interpretation in Other Countries
The primary jurisdiction doctrine shows that domestic
administrative law contains familiar mechanisms by which courts
could obtain administrative assistance in claim interpretation.
Similarly, the law of other jurisdictions demonstrates that such
mechanisms are not alien to the patent law. The European Patent
Convention (EPC), German law, and Japanese law, among others,
provide devices by which courts can obtain administrative assistance
on claim interpretation. Even in England, where centralization of
infringement litigation in a specialized court makes administrative
assistance less necessary, the patent agency has authority not only to
interpret claims but also to apply those interpretations in ruling on
infringement issues.156 The administrative role in claim interpretation
154. Referrals would provide the PTO with some data on the clarity of the claims that are
being approved by its examiners and would thus further the statutory goal of developing
quantitative measures of performance. See 35 U.S.C. § 2(B)(2)(F) (2000) (authorizing the
promulgation of regulations that “provide for the development of performance-based process
that includes quantitative and qualitative measures and standards for evaluating cost-
effectiveness”).
155. A. A. Berle, Jr., The Expansion of American Administrative Law, 30 HARV. L. REV.
430, 445 (1917).
156. See infra notes 171-77 and accompanying text.
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is already expanding in Japan and is destined to increase throughout
European countries if the Community Patent Convention is ratified or
if the European Union adopts a similar system conferring a truly
transnational patent right.
Administrative assistance concerning patents granted by the
European Patent Office (EPO) is available to the courts of every EPC
country pursuant article 25 of the EPC, which provides:
At the request of the competent national court trying an
infringement or revocation action, the European Patent Office
shall be obliged, against payment of an appropriate fee, to give
a technical opinion concerning the European patent which is
the subject of the action. The Examining Divisions shall be
responsible for the issue of such options.157
The procedure authorized by this provision resembles the informal
procedure authorized in American primary jurisdiction cases such as
Western Pacific Railroad and AAMA. For example, the parties have a
right to submit briefs to the EPO only if the requesting court permits,
and they can appear before the agency only at its request.158 The
technical opinion is not considered a “decision” of the agency, so no
appeal lies.159 Additionally, the EPO’s fee (about US $3,000) is very
157. Convention on the Grant of European Patent, Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 271 available at
<http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/epc/e/ma1.html> [hereinafter EPC].
158. See European Patent Office, Guidelines for Substantive Examination in the EPO, pt.
E, ch. XII, § 1.2, available at <http://www.european-patent-office.org/guidelines/english/
e_xii_1.htm> [hereinafter EPO Guidelines]. Section 1.2 provides:
1.2 The Examining Division responsible for the technical opinion should give the
parties an opportunity to submit arguments in writing if the court so permits. However,
the parties have no right to be heard before the EPO. Nevertheless, where the
Examining Division considers it necessary, it may invite the parties, via the court and
provided that the court so permits, either to be heard before the Examining Division or
to submit supplementary observations on specific points identified by the Examining
Division. If the parties are heard, such a hearing is not considered to constitute oral
proceedings within the meaning of Art. 116.
159. See EPO Guidelines, supra note 158, pt. E, ch. XII, § 1.3 (“The technical opinion is
not a ‘decision’ of the EPO. The parties to the national proceedings therefore have no right of
appeal before the EPO against an ‘unfavourable’ opinion.”). This rule precludes the sort of
appeal from the agency’s decision that the parties in AAMA are currently trying to convince the
D.C. Circuit to entertain. See supra note 125.
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modest for an expert opinion.160
Although article 25 was “intended to contribute towards the
consistency in the interpretation of European patents,”161 its
usefulness has been limited by the EPO’s implementing regulations,
and the procedure has not been invoked frequently.162 The regulations
require the requesting national court to formulate its request “clearly
and precisely” and “where possible to separate clearly the legal
aspects from the technical aspects upon which it seeks the opinion of
the EPO.”163 Moreover, the rules bar the agency from “giv[ing] any
opinion on the extent of protection (article 69 and accompanying
Protocol).”164 Since article 69 of the EPC states that the extent of
160. The fee charged by the EPO is 3,067 EUs or 2,070 British Pounds, which is
approximately $ 3,000. See European Patent Office, available at <http://www.european-patent-
office.org/epo/new/prices_7_99.pdf> (item 20, page 8) (schedule of fees effective July 1, 1999).
161. ROMUALD SINGER & MARGARETE SINGER, THE EUROPEAN PATENT CONVENTION 83
(Ralph Lunzer trans., 1995).
162.  As of January 2000, the EPO had issued only three technical opinions pursuant to
article 25— one each in 1995, 1998 and 1999. See Letter from Gabi Richter, European Patent
Office, to John Duffy (Jan. 11, 2000) (on file with author).
163. EPO Guidelines, supra note 158, pt. E, ch. XII, § 2.3. Section 2.3 provides in full:
2.3 It is to be expected that a request from a national court will be clearly and precisely
formulated, so that the Examining Division will be in no doubt as to the questions on
which the court wishes to have an opinion. Since the court is responsible for deciding
the issues of law involved in the questions and since most questions include a mixture
of legal and technical aspects, the court is expected where possible to separate clearly
the legal aspects from the technical aspects upon which it seeks the opinion of the
EPO.
The tenor of that section seems to undercut the promise of helpfulness made earlier in the
guidelines:
2.1 The Examining Division is obliged to give a “technical opinion” upon request.
This means that the Division is bound to give an opinion only insofar as the questions
put are of a technical character. However, the Examining Division should not be too
restrictive in this regard but should attempt to assist the national court as much as is
reasonably possible, while remembering that the actual decision on infringement or
revocation is exclusively a matter for the national court.
Id. § 2.1.
164. Id. § 2.2. Section 2.2 provides in full:
Generally speaking, the Examining Division should attempt to give a technical opinion
on any question which is similar to those normally dealt with in European substantive
examination work, even when the question has a legal, as well as a technical, aspect.
On the other hand, the Examining Division should decline to make any specific
statement on whether a patent is valid or on whether it is infringed. It should also not
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patent protection is “determined by the terms of the claims” and the
accompanying Protocol supplies principles for interpreting claims,165
the regulations restrict the agency’s authority under article 25 to
opine on the ultimate issues of claim interpretation. The regulations
do indicate that the agency may answer questions having “a legal, as
well as technical, aspect.”166 Thus, the EPO probably can issue
opinions on subsidiary questions, such as how persons skilled in the
relevant art would understand the terms used in claims, without
violating the prohibition on opinions concerning extent of patent
protection.
The theory underlying the American primary jurisdiction doctrine
helps to explain the EPO’s reluctance to interpret claims. One of the
central goals of the primary jurisdiction doctrine— furthering
uniformity of result (here, a transnational uniformity)— is simply not
an unqualified goal of the European Patent Convention. The EPC is
intended to provide a unified examination process but not a unified
patent right. Instead, an EPC patent is a “bundle” patent— once
granted, it functions as a bundle of national patents from the
signatory nations. The patent rights conferred are governed by each
nation’s own domestic laws and need not be identical. Within such a
legal framework, the limitations on the EPO’s article 25 power make
sense: The agency can provide courts with a central source of
technical assistance, including assistance that might implicate claim
interpretation. However, deciding the ultimate scope of protection is
left to the courts of member states, which may, consistent with the
EPC, afford somewhat different levels of protection.
Similar to EPC article 25 is article 29 of the German Patent Law,
which authorizes the courts to seek an opinion from the German
Patent Office whenever a court has been presented with conflicting
views.167 Because a German patent should have a uniform
interpretation throughout the German Federal Republic, there is no
theoretical reason for the German Patent Office to refrain from
opining on claim interpretation. In fact the agency will address
give any opinion on the extent of protection (Art. 69 and the accompanying Protocol).
165. EPC, supra note 157, art. 69.
166. EPO Guidelines, supra note 158, pt. E, ch. XII, § 2.2.
167. SINGER & SINGER, supra note 161, at 83.
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“technical questions such as the interpretation of patent claims, their
scope in the light of the prior art, whether the invention of one patent
cannot be performed without infringing another, [and] common
knowledge or practice in any given industry.”168
German courts have shown a willingness to afford some deference
to administrative claim constructions. In a recent decision
denominated Regenbecken,169 the German Federal Supreme Court
(Bundesgerichtshof) ruled that, although the Federal Patent Court is
not legally bound by the EPO’s construction of patent claims, it
nonetheless must treat the agency’s administrative claim
interpretations as “expert opinions of significant importance that must
be considered in the evaluation of patentability.”170 The approach in
the Regenbecken case— respecting the expertise of the administrative
agency but not viewing its opinion as legally binding— is similar to
that taken under weaker forms of the primary jurisdiction doctrine,
though the deference afforded the agency seems less than would be
due an agency’s decision on a mixed question of law and fact under
traditional principles of American administrative law.
Both Germany and the EPC have a decentralized judicial system
for litigating patent infringement suits but a centralized
administrative system for granting patents. Providing a mechanism
for the courts to obtain the expertise of the agency has more value in
those systems than in a country such as the United Kingdom, which
has a specialized Patents Court that hears all appeals from decisions
of the patent agency and tries infringement matters.171 Still, United
168. Id. (quoting SCHULTE, PATENTGESETZ, § 29 (5th ed. 1994). The German Patent Office
can also render a technical opinion on a European patent for which Germany is a designated
country. See id. at 86. Thus, German courts may often be able to obtain a technical opinion
from either, or both, the EPO and the German Patent Office. Id.
169. Rainwater Reservoir (Regenbecken), 30 IIC 678 (BGH 1999).
170. Id. at 682 (rejecting the EPO’s claim interpretation). The limited deference afforded in
Regenbacken is consistent with prior commentary. See SINGER & SINGER, supra note 161, at 83
(quoting SCHULTE, PATENTGESETZ § 29 (5th ed. 1994)) (noting that, although the German
Patent Office may issue opinions on claim interpretation and even on some infringement issues,
“questions of law such as infringement, or scope of protection, remain exclusively within the
province of the court”).
171. The Patents Court was established as part of the Chancery Division of the High Court
pursuant to § 96 of the Patent Act of 1977. See WILLIAM ALDOUS ET AL., TERRELL ON THE
LAW OF PATENTS § 1.18, 10 (13th ed. 1982); see also id. § 16-96, 563 (reproducing the text of
§ 96 of the Patent Act of 1977). Although § 96 of the Patent Act was repealed in 1981, its
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Kingdom law does provide a mechanism whereby its Patents Court
can, during the trial of an infringement case, seek an administrative
claim interpretation, though the Patents Court does not appear to be
very interested in invoking the procedure.172 In addition, a private
party can obtain an administrative claim interpretation by seeking a
declaration of noninfringement from the Comptroller General of the
Patent Office.173 If the Comptroller’s decision is not overturned on
judicial review,174 the declaration of noninfringement has “the same
effect as a declaration or declarator by the court.”175 This declaration
is “binding against the Patentee and all successors in title.”176 Thus,
this administrative mechanism provides an alternative to court, albeit
substance was reenacted in § 6(1) of the Supreme Court Act of 1981. See UK MANUAL OF
PATENT PRACTICE IN THE UK PATENT OFFICE § 96.02 (1999) available at
<http://www.patent.gov.uk/dpatents/mpp/manual.html> [hereinafter UK MANUAL OF PATENT
PRACTICE]. The staff of the Patents Court includes judges who have “spent their careers at the
patent bar.” Justin Watts, Recent Developments at the Patents Court, 20 EUR. INTELL. PROP.
REV. N-26, N-27 (1998). For Scotland, jurisdiction in infringement actions is centralized in the
Court of Sessions, not the Patents Court. See Patent Act § 98(1) (United Kingdom), reprinted in
ALDOUS, supra, §§ 16-98, 564. 
172. See Patent Act § 99A(1), reprinted in UK MANUAL OF PATENT PRACTICE, supra note
171 (“Rules of court shall make provision empowering the Patents Court in any proceedings
before it under this Act, on or without the application of any party, to order the Patent Office to
inquire into and report on any question of fact or opinion.”). The Patent Office is entitled to
charge for the service, with the fee taxed as costs to the parties before the court. See id.
§ 99A(2). For actions in Scotland, the Court of Sessions has a similar power. See id. § 99B. The
rules of court required by § 99A had not yet been made as of November of 1998, see UK
MANUAL OF PATENT PRACTICE, supra note 171, § 99A.03, and the Patent Office’s Annual
Report for 1998-99 did not show any opinions rendered under that section. See Patent Office
Annual Report for 1998-99, 95-96 (1999) (Annex 5, table 1) (available at
<http://www.patent.gov.uk/snews/notices/anreport/>). 
173. Patent Act § 71 (U.K.). Korean law contains a slightly broader mechanism that
permits a patentee or any other interested person to request an administrative trial to confirm the
scope of a patent right. See Patent Law, art. 135(1) (S. Korea) (available at
<http://www.kipo.go.kr/ehtml/eInfPatent.html>). The trial is heard by the Industrial Property
Tribunal, which is established under the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of the Korean
Industrial Property Office. See id. art. 132bis. As under UK law, the administrative decision
becomes binding on the parties. See id. art. 165 (establishing the res judicata effect of
administrative trials). The courts are authorized to stay infringement litigation until the
administrative trial decision “becomes final and conclusive.” See id. art. 164(2). 
174. With few exceptions, which are not relevant here, all decisions of the Patent Office are
subject to judicial review in the Patents Court. See Patent Act § 97(1), reprinted in UK
MANUAL OF PATENT PRACTICE, supra note 171. See also UK MANUAL OF PATENT PRACTICE,
supra note 171, § 97.03 (noting the general statutory jurisdiction of the Patents Court to review
almost all decisions of the Patent Office).
175. Patent Act § 71(2), reprinted in ALDOUS, supra note 171, §§ 16-71, at 540.
176. ALDOUS, supra note 171, § 6.128, at 202.
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one that is not currently used with great frequency.177
These currently available mechanisms may, however, be only the
first steps in an expansion of administrative assistance available to
courts. The proposed Community Patent Convention (CPC), for
example, would expressly authorize the European Patent Office to
render opinions on “the extent of protection conferred by the patent”
and would, therefore, make available to the courts administrative
opinions on every aspect of patent claim interpretation.178 The
extension of administrative power follows the change that the CPC
would make in the rights granted by patents issued by the EPO.
Unlike the patents currently issued pursuant to the EPC— each of
which, as previously mentioned, is in theory a “bundle” of national
patents— a patent issued under the CPC (a “Community Patent”) will
have a “unitary character” with “equal effect throughout the
territories” of the contracting countries.179 Because the courts trying
infringement actions would remain decentralized, the administrative
opinion mechanism would provide a needed unifying influence
similar to that provided by the American primary jurisdiction
doctrine. And like the primary jurisdiction doctrine, the CPC’s
opinion mechanism would leave courts to determine both the
circumstances in which the mechanism should be invoked and the
weight to be given the administrative interpretation.180 Thus, the
177. See Patent Office Annual Report for 1998-99, supra note 172, at 96 (Annex 5, table 1)
(noting that three requests for a declarations pursuant to § 71 were made in 1998, all of which
were denied). 
178. Convention for the European Patent for the Common Market, Dec. 15, 1975, art. 78,
1976 O.J. (L 17) 1 [hereinafter CPC]. The administrative opinion would be rendered by a
Revocation Board which, despite its seemingly specialized name, would be given jurisdiction
over all administrative appeals under the CPC. See CPC art. 10.1 (conferring jurisdiction on the
Revocation Boards for all appeals from both the Revocation Division and the general Patent
Administration Division of the EPO).
179. CPC, supra note 178, art. 2.2.
180. See id. art. 78.3 (providing that the administrative “opinion shall not bind the national
court”); id. arts. 77.2, 78.2 (both conferring discretion in the infringement court to seek the
administrative opinion). The CPC would authorize two mechanisms for obtaining an
administrative opinion. First, if an administrative proceeding (such as an opposition to, a
request for limitation of, or an application for the revocation of the patent) is already pending
with the EPO, a national court having before it “proceedings relating to the Community patent”
may stay those proceedings pending the outcome of the administrative proceedings. Id. art.
77.2. If a national court does choose to stay proceedings, the EPO must, at the conclusion of the
administrative proceedings, express an opinion on the extent of patent protection (provided, of
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opinion mechanism would provide a flexible administrative process
for assisting Europe’s decentralized court system, while preserving
judicial authority over administrative processes.
The administrative assistance available to courts is already
expanding in Japan. Article 71 of Japanese Patent Law authorizes the
Japanese Patent Office (JPO) to respond to any “request for
interpretation . . . with respect to the technical scope of a patented
invention.”181 The resulting administrative opinion is treated as
“similar to an expert opinion,”182 and the cost is kept low— a mere
40,000 yen (less than $400).183 This administrative opinion
procedure, known as the hantei system, was extended by a recent
amendment to the Japanese Patent Law so that courts may invoke the
procedure.184 Prior to the amendment, private parties invoked hantei
mechanism quite frequently, with the JPO rendering (on average)
more than one dozen technical opinions per year on utility patents
and more than two dozen opinions on utility model and design
patents.185 By permitting judicial requests for such opinions, Japan
course, that the administrative proceedings maintain the patent). Id. art. 78.1. Second, even
where no administrative proceedings are pending, a national court presiding over infringement
proceedings “may, of its own motion or at the request of one of the parties and after hearing the
other parties,” seek an opinion from the EPO. Id. art. 78.2. The EPO is then required to give the
opinion upon payment of the appropriate fee. See id. art. 78.3.
181. Tokkyo Ho [Patent Law], Law No. 121 of April 13, 1959, as amended, art. 71(1),
available at <http://www.jpo-miti.go.jp/shoukaie/patent.htm#71>. Once a request is made, the
Commissioner of the Japanese Patent Office designates three trial examiners to give the
interpretation. See id. art. 71(2). Under Japanese law, the “technical scope of a patented
invention” is “determined on the basis of the statements of the patent claim(s),” so the phrase is
synonymous with claim interpretation. Id. art. 70.
182. Toshiko Takenaka, Recent Legislative Update in Japan, 6 CASRIP Newsl. (1999)
available at <http://www.law.washington.edu/casrip/newsletter/newsv6i1jp2.html> .
183. Email from Kunio Fujishiro, Deputy Director, International Affairs Division, Japanese
Patent Office, to John Duffy (Jan. 6, 2000) (on file with author) (noting cost of an
administrative opinion).
184. See Takenaka, supra note 182 (noting the enactment of new article 71bis of the
Japanese Patent Act); Email from Kunio Fujishiro, Deputy Director, International Affairs
Division, Japanese Patent Office, to John Duffy (Jan. 5, 2000) (on file with author) (noting that
article 71bis of the Japanese Patent Law came into effect on January 1, 2000 and that, under the
new provision, “courts are also allowed to file a request with the JPO for technical opinions”).
An English translation of the new provision should become available on the JPO’s website by
midsummer 2000.
185. The number of technical opinions rendered by the JPO from 1989-1998 are given in
the following table:
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has created an expedient mechanism for its courts to obtain expert
administrative assistance in a manner similar to that authorized by the
American primary jurisdiction doctrine. Time will tell whether the
mechanism will become popular with the courts.
III. THE SCIENCE OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN: QUALITATIVE AND
QUANTITATIVE EVALUATIONS
The innovation proposed in this article is the use of administrative
opinions to assist federal courts in claim interpretation. The proposal
is designed to avoid the difficult choice, which so fractured the
Federal Circuit in Cybor, between national uniformity and procedural
expedience in claim interpretation. The doctrinal analogies for such a
mechanism include the primary jurisdiction doctrine of American
administrative law and the administrative opinion mechanisms that
exist under the patent laws of other industrialized countries. Doctrinal
analogies are, however, insufficient justification to adopt an
innovation if the science of institutional design is to be held to the
rigorous standards of other technologies. Quantitative proof would be
better, but it does not exist. This part of the article, therefore, will
provide a qualitative analysis and discuss possible methods for
obtaining quantitative data on the procedural efficiency of the
proposal.
Defining the scope of the rights protected is an essential part of
Number of Opinions in Category:
Year Patents Utility Models Design Patents Trademarks Total
1989 11 18 14 3 46
1990 12 6 17 10 45
1991  9 9 5 6 29
1992 13 13 5 6 37
1993 9 23 15 4 51
1994 23 9 11 3 46
1995 18 8 12 2 40
1996 9 10 8 1 28
1997 8 12 10 5 35
1998 20 17 22 16 75
Source: Email from Kunio Fujishiro, Deputy Director, International Affairs Division, Japanese
Patent Office, to John Duffy (Jan. 5, 2000) (on file with author). Technical opinions were
requested by both intellectual property owners and potential infringers in roughly equal
numbers. See id.
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any property rights system, but it is not an easy or an inexpensive
task.186 Even with more tangible species of property, defining
property rights with precision presents well recognized, fundamental
difficulties. As one commentator on secured transactions notes,
certificate of title systems for such familiar property as motor
vehicles suffer from an “incapacity . . . to define what constitutes the
item subject to the certificate of title”— a problem that “results from
an inherent inability of thought and language to describe adequately
what we know.”187 If our legal machinery has difficulty defining with
precision what constitutes a “truck,”188 we should not be surprised if
more serious difficulties arise in defining intangible, conceptual
property rights in subject matter both new and nonobvious.189
Absolute precision may not be possible, but greater precision is.
The now standard claim format developed in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries was itself a procedural innovation directed toward
defining patent rights with greater certainty. Claims achieve that goal
only to the extent that they can be interpreted and applied in a
predictable manner and at reasonable cost. Currently, three
governmental institutions interpret claims: the agency, the trial
courts, and the Federal Circuit. Some allocations of responsibility
among those institutions are likely better than others.
Standard economic analysis posits that “[t]he objective of any
procedural system . . . is to minimize the sum of two types of cost”—
the cost of erroneous decisions and the cost of operating the
procedural system.190 Applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to
claim interpretation would shift some interpretive power from the
courts to the responsible administrative agency. The principal benefit
186. See Paul Shupack, On Boundaries and Definitions: A Commentary on Dean Baird, 80
VA. L. REV. 2273, 2280 (1994) (noting the general agreement that “[d]efining something is a
very difficult task”).
187. Id. (“The core failing of title recordation for vehicles— the incapacity of a certificate
of title system to define what constitutes the item subject to the certificate of title— results from
an inherent inability of thought and language to describe adequately what we know.”).
188. See id. (noting litigation over what constitutes the truck in which a security interest
was given).
189. See Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 396 (Ct. Cl. 1967)
(comparing claim interpretation to statutory interpretation and noting that the problem caused
by “[t]he inability of words to achieve precision . . . is likely more acute with claims” than with
statutes).
190. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.1, 517 (3d ed. 1986).
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from the proposal can be predicted with relatively high confidence: It
would reduce the cost of operating the procedural system. In large
part, this is definitional. Evaluating any proposed substitution of
administrative for judicial processes must assume particular
conceptions of the “administrative” and “judicial” processes. Those
assumed conceptions are the existing administrative and judicial
processes in the American patent system. The patent agency is a
centralized, expert body that acts through informal procedures, while
the courts are a combination of decentralized, nonexpert tribunals and
a centralized, expert appellate body, both of which operate with
elaborate, formal procedures. To propose substituting administrative
for judicial process within such a system is to propose reducing the
formality and expense of the legal process.191
Other considerations also suggest that administrative processes
could reduce the expense of claim interpretation. Allocating
decisional authority to an administrative agency substitutes, to some
extent, decisionmakers who are familiar with claim construction for
district judges who, generally, are not. At a minimum, such a
substitution should reduce the costs of acquainting the nonspecialist
district judge with the intricacies and formalities of claim drafting.192
Furthermore, rough estimates of the cost of administrative claim
interpretations are possible, and the estimates demonstrate the
magnitude of possible savings on litigation expenditures. For
191. The terms “administrative” and “judicial” can, of course, cover a broad range of
processes that nearly overlap. Thus, substituting administrative for judicial processes makes
little difference where, for example, the administrative processes are similar in formality to
those of the National Labor Relations Board or the Tax Court, and the judicial body is a
centralized expert court such as the Court of International Trade. Indeed, the proper
classification of such institutions for doctrinal purposes generates debate both in our legal
culture and in others. See, e.g., William Cook, Judicial Review of the EPO and the Direct Effect
of TRIPS in the European Community, 19 EURO. INTELL. PROP. REV. 367, 373 (1997) (noting
that, for purposes of determining whether judicial review of an EPO patenting decision is
available, the UK Patents Court considers the EPO’s Boards of Appeals to constitute “courts”
because “the Boards are independent of administrative functions, independent of the parties and
independent of the decision of the [EPO] Division appealed from” and also because “the
members of the Boards have tenure”).
192. See William F. Lee & Anita K. Krug, Still Adjusting to Markman: A Prescription for
the Timing of Claim Construction Hearings, 13 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 55, 66 (1999) (noting that,
in interpreting patent claims, district courts “seem to need and want as much technical help as
they can obtain” and that “[t]he courts are correct in this desire because a well-informed claim
construction is more likely to be the right one”).
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example, the cost of a technical opinion from the EPO is merely three
thousand dollars, and the process is so streamlined that the parties
need not submit briefs or make an appearance before the agency.193
Three thousand dollars is, perhaps, equivalent to ten hours of a patent
attorney’s time. If such an expenditure has even a five percent
probability of eliminating the need for a retrial (i.e., if one in twenty
administrative opinions prevents a divergence in claim interpretation
between the Federal Circuit and the district court), then the
expenditure would reduce the expense of claim interpretation
provided that a retrial would require at least two hundred hours of
attorney time, which is approximately equal to the work of five
attorneys in one week.
The principle cost of shifting toward administrative claim
interpretation is the risk that administrative interpretations might be
inferior to judicial interpretations, but this risk should not be large.
One point is relatively straightforward: The quality of an
authoritative claim interpretation depends not on its fidelity to some
abstract ideal of interpretation, but on its predictability. If patent
attorneys advising their clients can reliably predict how particular
claim language will be interpreted in enforcement proceedings, then
the claim has served its purpose. Thus, if administrative and judicial
claim interpretations systematically differ but each is as predictable
as the other, neither should be viewed as superior to the other.
Beyond this initial point, further progress in the analysis is
complicated by the absence of empirical data measuring the
predictability or certainty of either judicial or administrative claim
interpretations. There is, nonetheless, some reason to think that the
quality or predictability of claim interpretations under the proposed
system would not be significantly inferior, and may even be superior,
to predictability under the current system. Shifting some interpretive
responsibility from generalist district courts to the agency would
increase specialization within the patent system, and the history of
patent administration suggests that specialized institutions advance
predictability. The most important increases in centralization of the
United States patent system occurred in 1836 and 1982, with the
193. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
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creation of, respectively, the examination system within the Patent
Office and the Federal Circuit. In each case, greater specialization
was prompted by a perceived need to increase the predictability of
the system and, in each case, the change was believed to have
achieved that goal.194
The United States is not alone in creating specialized institutions
for the patent system. All major industrialized countries employ a
centralized patent agency to conduct substantive examinations of
patent applications, not merely to register applications as had been
done in the United States prior to 1836. Many have specialized
administrative or judicial tribunals in which certain aspects of patent
litigation are adjudicated. Indeed, the United Kingdom recently
experimented with a specialized trial court having less formal,
streamlined procedures (the “Patents County Court”), and the results
so far “bode[] well for consistency and reliability of decision-making;
and probably a decreasing need for appeals.”195 In general, the trend
during the last century and a half appears to be toward greater
specialization to increase the procedural efficiency of the patent
system.196
194. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6-25 (1989) (identifying the absence of uniformity and
predictability in patent law as a reason for creating the Federal Circuit); John F. Duffy, The
FCC and the Patent System: Progressive Ideals, Jacksonian Realism, and the Technology of
Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1071,1125-29 (2000) (detailing the uncertainty in the patent
system that precipitated the creation of an administrative examination system in 1836). The
decision in Cybor may also be seen as part of the trend toward specialization because the
decision centralizes claim interpretation at the Federal Circuit. But the Federal Circuit is
inherently less specialized than the PTO. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit was
broadened to include a variety of non-patent matters to avoid the perceived dangers in creating
an excessively specialized court. See S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 6, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
11, 16 (noting that the Senate committee rejected a proposal to limit the Federal Circuit’s
jurisdiction to patent appeals because such an approach was “inconsistent with the imperative of
avoiding undue specialization with the Federal judicial system”); Charles W. Adams, The Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: More Than a National Patent Court, 49 Mo. L. Rev. 43, 61
(1984); Dreyfuss, supra, at 4. 
195. Richard Price, Patent Litigation in England— Quiet Revolution, 17 EUR. INTELL.
PROP. REV. D-290 (1995). See also John N. Adams, Choice of Forum in Patent Disputes, 17
EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 497, 499-502 (1995) (evaluating the first five years of performance
by the Patents County Court and concluding that the court was able to expedite legal processes
without sacrificing the quality of decisionmaking).
196. This, of course, assumes that greater predictability and certainty in the patent system
always has a positive social value. But the marginal social value of increasing certainty in the
patent system is unknown. Professors Ayres and Klemperer recently argued that, under one set
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In other areas of law, specialized tribunals appear to be the choice
of parties who have good incentives to choose procedurally efficient
institutions. For example, the perennial winner in the competition to
attract the business of corporate chartering, Delaware, uses a
specialized chancery court to hear corporate law cases. Expertise
developed in those cases helps to create a predictability in decisions
that private parties stress as an important reason for choosing
Delaware as the state of incorporation.197
While these qualitative analyses provide some insight, they are
not the rigorous quantitative results demanded for other technologies.
If legal institutions and processes are to be refined with precision,
quantitative methods must be devised for testing and evaluating
institutional and procedural variations. Market mechanisms work
well in evaluating innovations, provided that the sellers and buyers
internalize all the costs and benefits of the new product. However,
care is required to construct such a well-functioning “market” for
legal processes. The market for corporate charters may be one
example of a good market for legal technology. Another may be the
market for arbitration services, at least where the parties agreeing to
the arbitration are sophisticated and well-informed. At the other
of assumptions, increasing the uncertainty of patent rights could actually increase the social
value of the patent system. See Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power
Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-
Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985 (1999). Indeed, Ayres and Klemperer specifically
note that “reallocations of authority from nonspecialist judges and juries to the specialist
Federal Circuit presumptively reduce the uncertainty of patent law” and that such reallocations
“run[] against the implications of our model.” Id. at 1023-24. The effect theorized by Ayers and
Klemperer can be ignored here provided that the proposed change reduces the cost of operating
the procedural system, in comparison to current law. For if the procedural change conserves
resources but produces undesirable certainty in patent rights, the prior level of uncertainty can
be restored by an inexpensive random process such as throwing dice. Net social welfare is then
increased, provided the random process costs less to operate than the savings realized by
switching to the cheaper procedural system. Although full consideration of Ayres and
Klemperer’s theory is beyond the scope of this article, it is nonetheless worth noting that the
political economy is likely to push the patent system toward greater certainty. Even under Ayres
and Klemperer’s theory, the positive effects of uncertainty will be reaped only by a diffuse class
of consumers. Businesses, however, may still favor certainty. See Christopher Tootal, The
European Patent System: Time for Review?, 17 EURO. INTELL. PROP. REV. 415, 415 (1995)
(observing that “[i]f there is one single phenomenon that businessmen dislike in any aspect of
the running of their firms, . . . it is uncertainty. In the field of patents they need clear answers at
the earliest possible opportunity as to whether a patent is valid and whether it is infringed.”).
197. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 39-40 (1993).
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extreme, practices generally known as “forum shopping” are good
examples where parties seek legal processes that are better for
themselves, but not necessarily more efficient because the benefits
come at the expense of others.198 The task is to create structures that
encourage parties to choose more efficient legal processes, not
merely ones that will favor an identifiable side in a controversy.
For administrative claim interpretations, one possible “market”
mechanism would be for the PTO to provide administrative claim
interpretations to any person willing to pay a fee that recoups the
agency’s expense of preparing the opinion. If the opinion were not
treated as authoritative by the courts, it would not confer benefits on
the requestor at the expense of third parties. Nonauthoritative
administrative opinions may not be popular, however, because such
opinions can be obtained with greater confidentiality from private
attorneys.
The main reason to obtain the PTO’s opinion, rather than a private
attorney’s opinion, is the hope or expectation that a court would grant
some measure of deference, formal or informal, to the agency’s
views. If such deference were afforded, then the market
mechanism— the agency’s sale of the opinion— would no longer be
an accurate gauge of procedural efficiency because the opinion could
create externalities. For example, if the agency’s opinions predictably
favored potential infringers by systematically interpreting claims
narrowly and those opinions were granted some deference by the
courts, then the agency’s success in selling its opinions might reflect
the opinion’s value to potential infringers as a means to shift costs to
patentees.
A better test of procedural efficiency would involve the mutual
198. John N. Adams, Choice of Forum in Patent Disputes, 17 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV.
497, 499-502 (1995) (noting that “where a case is problematic, a patentee may choose to bring
[an action] before a tribunal where the judge is a non-specialist in the hope of getting a result in
a way which would be impossible before the judges of jurisdictions which have specialist
judges”). Forum shopping in patent disputes has generated a fair amount of controversy in
Europe. For a particularly ingenious technique spotted by one astute commentator, see Mario
Franzosi, Worldwide Patent Litigation and the Italian Torpedo, 19 EURO. INTELL. PROP. REV.
382 (1997) (noting that, by bringing an action for a declaration of non-infringement in a country
with a slow judicial system, an accused infringer can preclude enforcement actions in the courts
of other European Union Member States, which must, under article 21 of the Brussels
Convention of 1968, decline jurisdiction while the first action is pending).
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agreement by both sides in infringement litigation to the procedure.
Thus, if both sides in a case are willing to refer an issue of claim
construction to the PTO and to afford deference to the resulting
agency opinion, a court should permit and respect the agreement.
Such agreements, if they occurred, would provide good evidence that
the administrative process is more efficient than a purely judicial
process.199
The converse, however, is not true: The absence of agreements to
seek administrative assistance does not necessarily mean that the
administrative process is less efficient. One party in litigation may
have an incentive to prefer a less accurate procedure, where the
outcome in the accurate forum would likely be adverse to that party.
Or a party may prefer a more dilatory forum, where that party is
likely to be held liable for damages but no prejudgment interest is
available.200 In such circumstances, agreements between the parties to
reduce the costs of litigation might be possible only where the parties
believe that procedural change would not change the timing or the
substance of the decision.201 Moreover, parties to litigation do not
bear the full cost of the judicial process because the process is
subsidized through general government expenditures. For that reason,
judges properly have an interest in nudging parties toward
mechanisms that conserve judicial resources. Primary jurisdiction
permits such a judicial preference because courts may “invoke the
doctrine on their own motion.”202
199. This is so because the parties to the infringement litigation would internalize all, or
nearly all, of the costs and benefits associated with the change in procedure. Third parties may
still receive some benefits. For example, the shift to a fee-based administrative process might
conserve judicial resources that are subsidized by general tax revenues. Additionally, other
parties may also bear some costs. For example, if the effect theorized by Ayres and Klemperer
is correct, and if administrative claim interpretations increase certainty of the patent system,
then consumers would bear the costs of the increased certainty. See supra note 196. These
second-order effects are ignored here because few market mechanisms are entirely without
possible externalities. See also id. (noting that uncertainty, if desirable, can be reintroduced
through low-cost random processes).
200. See supra note 198.
201. Cf. POSNER, supra note 190, § 21.8, 532 (noting that “parties to litigation often find it
mutually advantageous to agree not to incur a particular litigation expense (for example, by
stipulating to a fact so that it doesn’t have to be established by testimony)”).
202. Fontan-de-Maldonado v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, 936 F.2d 630, 632 (1st Cir.
1991) (Breyer, J.).
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A third, better method for testing the efficiency of a procedural
system would be by mutual agreement before a dispute arises. This is
the typical method by which parties agree to arbitration; the
agreement is made before any dispute arises, usually at the time of
contract formation. That method is a better test of procedural
efficiency because, before a dispute arises, both parties are more
likely to share an interest in selecting the most efficient system for
resolving disputes.203
Applying this method to the patent system may seem difficult
because of the impossibility of establishing agreements between
patentees and infringers before a dispute arises. This difficulty,
however, can be partially overcome. Patentees and their assignees
could be asked to consent to a procedural innovation at the time of
patenting, with understanding that the consent will apply to all patent
litigation in which the party is involved as either plaintiff or
defendent. If those preferences are respected only when both sides of
an infringement action have consented, then some firms— i.e., those
that can foresee being plaintiff in some infringement actions and
defendant in others— would have good incentives to consent only if
they believed that the procedural innovation was efficient. Such a
system could be used to test not only an administrative claim system
but also other procedural innovations. While the system would not
provide as accurate a gauge of an innovation’s value as a market with
price mechanisms, it would provide quantitative data useful in
evaluating procedural changes and could help to advance the useful
art of legal process.
203. Two reasons explain the shared interest in choosing the procedurally efficient system.
First, before a dispute arises, the parties may not know what positions they will occupy in any
dispute. Lacking that information, the parties tend to ignore biases of the procedural system for
or against a particular side and to prefer a system that minimizes the sum of error costs and
operating costs. Second, in a contractual setting, one side may be able to compensate the other
for accepting a procedural system that is predictably less favorable to that side’s interests.
Where such compensation is possible, both sides will share an interest in finding the system that
minimizes the sum of error costs and operating costs. 
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IV. CONCLUSION
The decisions in Markman and Cybor have begun to sketch the
law governing the legal process of claim interpretation. The decisions
are mere prolegomena. Questions remain to be answered; problems
remain to be solved. This article has focused on one conundrum
confronting the courts. National uniformity of claim interpretations is
thought to be desirable. The Federal Circuit can provide such
uniformity, and it is also a knowledgeable interpreter of patent
claims. But centralizing claim interpretation in the Federal Circuit
also has its costs. Most dramatically, the Federal Circuit’s reversal of
district court claim interpretations can waste an entire infringement
trial. More subtly, centralization of claim interpretation in the Federal
Circuit might diminish the quality of interpretations or otherwise
impose costs to the extent that the appellate forum is not well suited
to inquiring into facts or to providing interpretations early in a
controversy.
Doctrines of deference and appellate review mediate the necessary
compromises between the various procedural costs and benefits.
Currently the case law has considered three doctrinal possibilities.
The Federal Circuit can review claim construction de novo as a pure
issue of law; it can grant deference to the district courts on the theory
that claim construction involves predicate factual issues; or it can
review de novo but accept interlocutory appeals. This article
considers another possibility based on the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, which allows a trial court to obtain an advisory opinion
from a centralized, expert administrative agency. In other areas of
American administrative law, this doctrine is applied in a flexible
manner, without regard to the characterization of an issue as law or
fact and without rigid rules requiring courts to apply, or not to apply,
the doctrine in any particular case. The patent law of other countries
shows that such a technique is not an anomaly of American law but
one sensible tool for allocating decisional responsibility among
judicial and administrative forums.
The larger question in this inquiry, however, does not concern the
resolution of any particular question of legal process. The important
matter is the process by which our legal system attempts to improve
the machinery of law. In that effort, the legal profession might learn
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from the techniques of technological progress in other fields of
human endeavor. The aspiration is to improve not only the processes
of law, but the processes of formulating law as well. That aspiration,
ambitious as it is, is not too daring for a youthful field of law that has
already proven itself so vital to the “Progress of Science and the
useful Arts.”
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